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Abstract
Our nation’s privately owned critical infrastructure is at risk. Malicious actors
are constantly developing exploitation techniques that circumvent traditional IP con-
trols. Honeypots are a technique that can mitigate the risk of these threats. Effective
honeypots are authentic and targetable, and their design and implementation must
accommodate risk tolerance and financial constraints. Developing honeypots for In-
dustrial Control System (ICS) networks is difficult. The proprietary, and often ex-
pensive, hardware and software used by ICS devices creates the challenging problem
of building a flexible, economical, and scalable honeypot.
Honeyd is an existing open source framework designed to create a large footprint
of traditional Information Technology (IT) honeypots, however, it lacks authenticity
when implemented with an ICS. This research extends Honeyd into Honeyd+, making
it possible to use the proxy feature to create multiple high interaction honeypots with
a single Programmable Logic Controller (PLC).
This research begins with pilot studies to examine the behavior of the PLC and
Honeyd. The results establish scope and context for the development and evaluation
of the Honeyd+ modifications. Honeyd+ is tested with a network of 75 decoy PLCs,
and the interactions with the decoys are compared to a physical PLC to test for
authenticity. The performance test evaluates the impact of multiple simultaneous
connections to the PLC to determine targetability.
The functional test is successful in all cases. The performance test demonstrates
that the PLC component is a limiting factor, and that introducing Honeyd+ has a
marginal impact on performance. Notable findings are that the Raspberry Pi is the
preferred hosting platform for the EtherNet/IP protocol and more than five simulta-
neous connections significantly decrease performance.
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CONSTRUCTING COST-EFFECTIVE AND TARGETABLE ICS HONEYPOTS
SUITED FOR PRODUCTION NETWORKS
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
On November 20, 2014, the Director of the National Security Agency, Admiral
Mike Rogers stated that several actors, including China, Russia, and other groups
have the capability to disrupt utilities such as the distribution of electricity and other
energy assets throughout the United States causing physical destruction, personal
injury, and even death [10].
Admiral Rogers further expressed his desire to share threat intelligence with the
private sector, but implied that the private sector lacks the ability to collect and ana-
lyze precise network sensor data required to make the intelligence useful in detecting,
preventing, and recovering from a cyber attack. This is due in part to reliance on
IP-based protection devices, such as intrusion detection systems and firewalls. Fur-
ther compounding the problem, malicious actors have a fundamental understanding
of current signature-based sensor technologies and can engineer malware to elude such
systems, making their activities undetectable. A honeypot is an effective method to
learn about an attacker’s tactics, techniques, and procedures [25, 31].
Cyber threats targeting critical infrastructure are genuine, and the upward trend
of incidents poses significant risk to national security. In 2013, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Response
Team (ICS-CERT) responded to 257 cyber incidents. The energy sector, which in-
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cludes petroleum, natural gas, and electricity generation and distribution, accounted
for 145 (56%) of those incidents. Cyber incidents on critical infrastructure continue
to increase, up 30% from the previous year [11].
1.2 Assumptions
This research uses the following assumptions:
• Traditional IT honeypot techniques do not transfer or scale easily to the ICS
sector. Hardware and software components are often proprietary and have
little publicly available documentation, which hinders third party development
of protection mechanisms.
• Equipment cost constrains honeypot implementation on Industrial Control Sys-
tem (ICS) networks.
• Computing resources for ICS components are designed to serve a specific pur-
pose, and are focused on accuracy and response time. ICS components do not
have the extensive processing power and memory resources of general purpose
computers that are designed to run multiple applications at once.
• Private organizations operating critical infrastructure are reluctant to introduce
additional mechanisms to their control systems. This is due to perceived–or
real–risk of interference, exposure of competitive business practices, or lack of
funding.
1.3 Research Goals and Hypothesis
The overarching goal of this research is to extend the functionality of an existing
honeypot framework so that it can replicate many decoy PLCs using one physical
PLC. The research hypotheses are:
2
• A passive network component between the attacker and the physical PLC can
present an accurate representation of many decoy PLCs to the attacker.
• The performance limitation of a PLC is the limiting factor of performance in
the honeypot implementation, thus limiting targetability.
• The high cost platform hosting the decoys has more computing resources avail-
able and will outperform the low cost platform.
1.4 Related Research
This research extends the work of R. Bodenheim, where a honeypot implementa-
tion examined whether the Shodan search engine lead to increased cyber attacks on
ICS devices exposed to the public Internet [3].
1.5 Thesis Layout
Chapter 2 describes the background and establishes context for this research.
Chapter 3 describes the development of the honeypot, and Chapter 4 explains the
methods used to evaluate the honeypot. Chapter 5 presents the results of the evalu-
ation. Finally, Chapter 6 offers conclusions and opportunities for further research.
3
II. Background
This chapter provides the background knowledge needed for a basic understanding
of honeypots, deploying honeypots in an ICS environment, and a description of the
existing Honeyd framework. A basic understanding of networking and ICS environ-
ments (e.g., components, basic functions, architecture, and terminology) is assumed.
Section 2.1 defines basic characteristics of honeypots, providing the basis for evalu-
ation. Section 2.2 provides a brief background on traditional honeypot terms and
technologies to establish context. Section 2.3 focuses on ICS honeypots, including
previous research. Finally, a description of the features and functionality of Honeyd
is introduced in Section 2.4.
2.1 Honeypot Characteristics
Successful honeypots balance the following characteristics: authenticity, targetabil-
ity, cost, and risk. An authentic honeypot mimics the features of a real computer
system. More realistic features yield a more complex honeypot, and collects more
detailed data. Honeypots are useless if the attacker avoids them. Therefore, a honey-
pot must be targetable; displaying a large enough presence to attract the attacker’s
attention. The financial cost is a major consideration, and includes the initial devel-
opment, deployment, maintenance, operation, data storage, and analysis of the data
collected.
Finally, there are several risks associated with a honeypot, namely attracting an
attacker, and dealing with the consequences of an attacker discovering the honeypot–
disabling or revealing the existence of the honeypot to others. One should carefully
consider risks, consequences, and mitigation measures prior to implementing any
honeypot solution.
4
Balancing cost with size and authenticity results in design tradeoffs that focuses
the honeypot implementation goals on the various stages of a cyberattack: reconnais-
sance, enumeration, gaining initial access, and maintaining access [29]. Honeypots
that are minimally authentic are suitable for detecting automated reconnaissance
probes, while high authenticity honeypots are required to study highly complex at-
tacks, such as an advanced persistent threat (APT).
2.2 Traditional IT Honeypots and Honeynets
Research on IT honeypots is plentiful and continues to evolve. Prior to 2006, tra-
ditional high-interaction honeypots were limited by costly physical hardware. Several
research efforts, including The Honeynet Project [30], explored the problem of cre-
ating and implementing realistic (i.e., authentic) honeypots with meaningful data
collection mechanisms, while minimizing the costs to develop, deploy, and maintain.
Virtualization technologies became widespread in the IT market between 2006 and
2008, making it convenient and inexpensive to deploy multiple high-interaction virtual
machines as honeypots to collect detailed data on cyber threats [25].
Some honeypots, called production honeypots, are created to serve as decoy sys-
tems. The decoys obscure the valuable assets, while logging mechanisms such as
syslog monitor for anomalous activity. A honeynet is an implementation of multi-
ple high-interaction honeypots in an engineered architecture that closely mimics the
aspects of a real production network. Deploying and monitoring a honeynet involves
increased financial costs, in the form of system design, equipment requirements, and
personnel considerations for managing the collection, analysis, and overall operation
of the honeynet [31]. There is no standard size of a successful honeynet. The security
objectives, network architecture, and available resources of the asset owner influences
the quantity of decoy systems required for an effective honeynet.
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In a honeynet architecture, the individual honeypot components should appear
and function identically to their real counterparts so that the attacker cannot dis-
tinguish the real systems from the decoys. However, the costs for such authenticity
multiplies as the size (i.e., targetability) increases, quickly making this solution pro-
hibitive. In other words, honeynets have a footprint big enough to attract potential
attackers, but the complexity of programming and equipment required can result in
lesser authenticity than what is required to capture and maintain the attention of a
serious malicious actor.
2.2.1 Production Versus Research Honeypots.
There are generally two categories of honeypots: production honeypots and re-
search honeypots. Production honeypots are primarily intended as sensors or decoys
to supplement existing security mechanisms on a production network [31]. Since they
are deployed on a production network, the goals are detection and deception; keeping
the attacker engaged with the honeypot so that they will not attack other assets on
the network. The ultimate goal is to use the production honeypot as a tool to sup-
plement signature-based detection devices in quickly detecting and recovering from
an attack. Production honeypots focus on minimizing costs and risk to the existing
network.
Research honeypots are intended to attract an attacker and sustain the attack for
as long as possible for the purpose of collecting detailed information such as unfore-
seen attack vectors, zero-day exploits, or post-attack activity (e.g., search terms for
sensitive data, production of phishing email messages, or capturing the attacker’s key
strokes). While this information is not directly valuable to the average business orga-
nization, it helps security researchers develop an understanding of the attacker, their
methods, and their motivations [30]. Research honeypots must be highly authentic,
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so they are generally more complex to configure and involve more effort to deploy,
monitor, and analyze.
2.2.2 Levels of Interaction.
There are generally two levels of interaction to describe the authenticity of a hon-
eypot. Low interaction honeypots emulate a limited behavior of a small number of
services. For example, a low interaction honeypot could return a static HTML file in
response to an HTTP GET request on TCP port 80. Low interaction honeypots can
range from simple scripts to elaborate emulation programs that require little configu-
ration, resources, or effort to deploy and manage, particularly in great numbers. For
these reasons, low interaction honeypots are an attractive foundation for production
honeypots [25]. Since low interaction honeypots only expose a subset of exploitable
features, they are limited in the amount of information they can collect. The reduced
authenticity also contributes to reduced risk. An attacker interacts with a controlled
simulation of predetermined responses and behaviors; a carefully designed low inter-
action honeypot is less likely to become assimilated into a botnet or used as a pivot
than a real system.
High interaction honeypots expose the full functionality of an operating system
and applications. Since it can be compromised in unexpected ways, additional miti-
gation techniques are required to isolate the malicious activity and reduce the risk to
the production network. High interaction honeypots often require extensive configu-
ration and dedicated equipment to ensure they are believable to an attacker. Common
techniques include rigging them with specific vulnerabilities, default passwords, and
phony sensitive data files. Covert monitoring logs all activity on the honeypot with-
out the attacker being able to detect that their activities are being recorded [25].
The advantages and disadvantages of the two levels of interaction are summarized in
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Table 2.1.
Table 2.1. Advantages and disadvantages of different levels of interaction [25].










2.3 Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Honeypots
The ICS sector lacks the advantages of virtualization that the IT sector has, so
there are currently few honeypot options that offer the same level of functionality
and flexibility as for traditional IT systems. Current research on ICS honeypots con-
sists mostly of low-interaction emulators [22, 26]. Low-interaction honeypots can be
deployed on inexpensive, flexible platforms like a Raspberry Pi or Gumstix, which
is a low-cost approach to replicating multiple decoys. One hidden drawback to low-
interaction honeypots is the extensive time and labor required to develop vendor-
specific protocols and usually feature a limited set of capabilities (e.g., lack of au-
thenticity, small size, etc.) [2, 16].
Research with high interaction ICS honeypots demonstrates more flexibility and
the potential to collect detailed data on evolving attack tactics, techniques, and pro-
cedures. The investment in a full-scale test bed is prohibitive to all but well-funded
research institutions and governments [15]. Such full-scale systems are rare and their
use is limited to controlled experimentation and research. They are rarely exposed to
the Internet to collect live threat data. Furthermore, these test bed environments are
often built to model a specific environment (e.g., power grid, water treatment plant,
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or refinery) and not flexible enough to adapt to implementation across a diverse in-
dustry.
A single Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) can range in cost from several hun-
dred dollars, such as the OMRON CP1L (approximately $900), to several thousand
dollars, such as the Allen-Bradley 1756-L61 (approximately $5500). The cost of mul-
tiple physical devices quickly limits the scalability for implementation as expendable
honeypots [32]. For instance, deploying authentic, targetable honeypots consisting of
30 L61 PLCs, the cost may be upward of $165,000 for the initial hardware.
2.3.1 Related Research.
CONPOT.
The Honeynet Project spawned CONPOT in May 2013 as an open source ICS
honeypot development effort [26]. The python-based framework features a config-
urable emulator (i.e., low-interaction) that mimics a Siemens S7-200 PLC (MODBUS,
HTTP, SNMP, and s7comm) and a web-based HMI. CONPOT encourages volunteers
to adapt and deploy instances of the emulator worldwide, sending their results back
to members of the project for analysis [26]. CONPOT demonstrates a decentralized
method of achieving a large honeynet by distributing the cost and risk among many
volunteers. This approach may not be acceptable for private enterprises, who may
interpret sharing such information as a threat to their competitive business strategy.
Impact of the SHODAN Computer Search Engine.
In 2013, R. Bodenheim conducted a study with physical PLC honeypots (i.e.,
high interaction) to determine if discovery by the Shodan [19] search engine increased
attack activity [3]. His conclusions noted that the honeypot design was limited to
four devices, and expanding the size of his honeypot (e.g., the number of honeypots
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exposed) was an opportunity for further research. One of Bodenheim’s recommenda-
tions was to amplify the presence of one physical PLC with the proxy capability of
a tool called Honeyd, hosted on a cloud computing platform such as Amazon’s EC2
service [3].
2.4 Honeyd
Honeyd is a low-interaction honeypot framework, developed by Neils Provos in
2004. Honeyd is free, open source software, released under GNU General Public
License[24]. It was designed to simulate network behavior and topologies for the
purpose of studying and defeating Internet worm propagation, such as the well-known
Slammer [6, 21], Code Red [5, 20], and Blaster [1, 7] worms .
The features of Honeyd make it an ideal framework on which to begin creating a
high-interaction honeynet that avoids acquiring dozens of physical PLCs. Namely, it
can create a large footprint and it is freely available. The desired honeypot is protocol
independent to accommodate a wide range of ICS equipment, and can achieve the
size required for effective production honeypot implementations.
The central component of Honeyd is a plain-text configuration file in which host
templates are defined. A Honeyd template defines the characteristics that the hon-
eypot host displays to the attacker. Honeyd hosts are created by associating IP
addresses with a template using the keyword “bind.”
The main characteristic of a Honeyd template is a “personality”, which is also the
keyword used to identify the operating system for the template to mimic. Honeyd
personalities are an implementation of the nmap fingerprint database, nmap-os-db[18].
Honeyd can also generate the Media Access Control (MAC) address. With a specified
name, Honeyd matches the vendor portion of the MAC address from the nmap im-
plementation of the IEEE Organizationally Unique Indentifiers (OUI) table [18], and
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can generate the remaining host portion. The Ethernet address can also be explicitly
specified, if desired.
Other characteristics of a template include ICMP type, TCP ports, and UDP
ports. The essence of the low-interaction capability provided by Honeyd is the re-
sponse, or “action,” carried out by associating scripts, executables, or subsystems
with each port. Honeyd features a built-in proxy capability that can forward incom-
ing connections to a physical host:port, providing a potential for high-interaction
functionality [23]. Figure 2.1 illustrates the basic architecture for a proposed imple-
mentation of Honeyd, and the interaction between an attacker and the PLC.
Figure 2.1. Anatomy of a Honeyd host.
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III. Device Description
This chapter covers definitions, design criteria, and development of the Honeyd
honeypot. Definitions and design considerations are discussed in Section 3.1. The
pilot studies are described in Section 3.2, and the subsequent modifications made to
Honeyd are addressed in Section 3.3.
3.1 Design Considerations
The goal of this research is to create an ICS honeypot that increases targetability
and authenticity without the increased cost. Honeyd is selected as the underlying plat-
form for the honeypot due to its demonstrated ability to generate a large footprint of
decoys [24]. The two PLCs used to conduct exploratory testing are the Omron CP1L
with a CP1W-EIP61 EtherNet/IP adapter and Allen-Bradley 1756-L61 ControlLogix
with a 1756-EWEB module.
3.1.1 Targetability.
A targetable honeypot should consist of multiple decoys to attract an attacker’s
attention among the millions of other hosts on the Internet. The decoys should also
appear in relevant surroundings. A lone PLC on the Internet is of little significance
to an attacker, because it is unlikely to be a part of a larger system. Several PLCs on
a contiguous subnet, perhaps with additional components such as a Human Machine
Interface (HMI) computer, could convince the attacker that the decoy is a legitimate
control system [4]. The proposed Honeyd implementation proxies several decoys to a
single PLC, therefore the PLC must be able to support higher data rates over multiple
simultaneous connections. One approach to measure the performance of the PLC over
various data rates is by error rate, or the ratio of sent data to valid responses. Optimal
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performance consists of an error rate below an established threshold.
3.1.2 Authenticity.
The decoy should be convincing enough that an attacker—either human or automated—
could progress through the reconnaissance, enumeration, and initial access phases of
an attack [29]. A common tactic during the reconnaissance and enumeration stages is
to use a port scanning and fingerprinting tool. Once the attacker observes the decoy,
the next step is to explore it.
Nmap is an open-source and freely available tool that can identify hosts on a subnet
(i.e., by IP address) and enumerate the open TCP/IP ports on each host. Nmap has
the capability to determine the host operating system–called fingerprinting–based on
analyzing the responses received from sending TCP/IP probes to open and closed
ports on a host. nmap has a feature called the Nmap Scripting Engine (NSE) that can
perform additional enumeration tasks, such as vulnerability detection in the form of
external scripts [18].
After identifying the hosts, and enumerating the operating system and network
services running on each of the hosts, the attacker’s next step is to explore the services
for additional information and exploitable vulnerabilities. The default nmap settings
enumerates the system ports (TCP/UDP 1-1023). The result of an initial scan of a
PLC would show the common TCP port 80/http as open. Exploration of the web
page would confirm that the device is a PLC, and could lead to additional protocol-
specific reconnaissance on user ports (TCP/UDP 1024-49151). Another consideration
is consistency, which is discussed in Section 3.2.2.
Measuring authenticity is accomplished by reproducing an attacker’s methods with
available tools, observing the responses of various commands and inquiries, under
both normal and abnormal conditions. Successful authenticity consists of observing
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accurate and consistent responses from the decoy that a similar, real physical device
would produce.
3.2 Pilot Studies
A series of pilot studies is required to determine the feasibility of using Honeyd as
an ICS honeypot solution, and to shape the specific metrics for evaluating authenticity
and targetability. The first pilot study enumerates the network identity of two PLCs.
The results form the basis for the initial configuration of Honeyd as well as a baseline
for comparison. The second pilot study compares an enumeration of a Honeyd host
to the baseline to determine if there are observable authenticity gaps. The third
pilot study establishes the range of data rates to develop a quantifiable metric for
targetability.
3.2.1 Pilot Study 1: Building a Honeyd Template.
The first pilot study uses nmap with operating system fingerprinting and an ex-
haustive enumeration of the full range of TCP/UDP responses of two different PLCs.
The nmap options used are summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. nmap options used to exhaustively enumerate both PLCs
Option Description
-sS TCP SYN Scan
-sU UDP Scan
-p* Scan TCP and UDP ports 1-65535
-PE ICMP Echo probes
-PP ICMP Timestamp Probes
-A
Enable OS detection, version detection,
script scanning, and traceroute
-sC
Runs all of the NSE scripts in the
”Default” category (101 scripts total)
-T4 Aggressive timing
-vv Very verbose output
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The results, summarized in Table 3.2, are used to construct the Honeyd templates.
Verbose results are in Appendix A. For a more efficient approach, only the well-known
ports (1-1024) and the additional discovered ports (e.g., 2222 and 44818) are included
in subsequent nmap scans. This is a safe assumption because nmap requires at least
one open and one closed port to conduct fingerprinting, and additional ports are
unlikely to appear on either the PLC or the Honeyd platforms without intentional
configuration.
Table 3.2. Pilot study 1 results.
L61 CP1L


















3.2.2 Pilot Study 2: Honeyd Authenticity Study.
Figure 3.1 illustrates an nmap scan of an empty subnet, and the same subnet
after launching Honeyd configured with a template of 75 Allen-Bradley 1756-L61
ControlLogix PLCs, using the information from pilot study 1. In the figure, each dot
is labeled with the IP address that responded to the nmap probes.
The initial test of Honeyd with an nmap scan appears successful. Nmap correctly
identifies the operating system and the open ports. However, upon deeper exami-
nation of the Honeyd hosts, authenticity flaws are discovered. Each of the Honeyd
hosts are identical, with no uniqueness among them (see Figure 3.2). A request for
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Figure 3.1. The attacker’s perspective: results after running an nmap scan on an empty
subnet (top) with 75 Honeyd hosts (bottom).
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the web page from all of the Honeyd hosts results in the same static web page for
the physical PLC, MAC Address, hostname, and serial number. Additionally, the
IP address listed on the web page does not match the IP address used to connect to
the Honeyd host. Pilot study 2 establishes the qualitative attributes of authenticity
that will be used in the evaluation. The successful attributes are denoted with a Xin
Table 3.3. Missing attributes are denoted with an X.
Figure 3.2. Authenticity flaws with the Honeyd hosts.
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Table 3.3. Results of pilot study 2.
Metric Consistent Unique
Open Ports X X
OS Fingerprint X X
IP Address X X
MAC Address X X
Hostname X X
Serial Number X X
3.2.3 Pilot Study 3: PLC Performance Study.
A custom Python script is designed to test performance of both the EtherNet/IP
protocol [9] and the HTTP protocol on each PLC. The script uses the python ENIP
class developed by S. Dunlap to craft the necessary packets for communication with a
PLC [12]. The test begins by opening a TCP connection to the PLC or Honeyd host,
and sending a protocol-specific request. It asynchronously collects and evaluates the
response, and the process is repeated for a fixed duration. Connections are executed
in separate execution threads in order to simulate simultaneous connections. At the
end of the test duration, the TCP connections are closed gracefully and the script
outputs the results to a text file. The error rate metric (lower is better), is calculated
from the output. The test script code is included in Appendix B.
A third pilot study validates the accuracy of the performance testing script and
establishes a maximum effective data rate for further testing. Testing conducted over
10, 30, and 60 second durations for each collection period showed that 30 seconds was
sufficient to reach a steady state on both PLC platforms considered for this study. The
performance pilot study also revealed that as the sending data rate increases, the PLC
responds by reducing the TCP Window size, eventually to zero. Thus, establishing an
error rate based on (sendsuccess−receivesuccess)/sendsuccess will result in measurements
biased by latency. For this research, the error rate definition is slightly modified by
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fixing the number of requests sent in a fixed time period to reduce measurement bias
related to latency. Therefore, considering the number of attempted requests against
the number of valid responses removes the bias. See Equation 3.1.
ErrorRate =
(sendattempt − sendsuccess) + (sendsuccess − receivesuccess)
sendattempt
(3.1)
Finally, the pilot study showed that the maximum number of simultaneous Ether-
Net/IP Sessions was 64 for the L61, and only 4 for the CP1L. Testing the maximum
sessions consisted of iteratively creating a TCP connection, followed by registering
an ENIP session. Both PLCs stopped responding to the register session request
when they reached their maximum. The connection limitation is documented in the
L61 specifications [27]; the limitation is not listed in either the CP1L nor the CP1W
EtherNet/IP module specifications [13]. The limitations apply to the maximum num-
ber of simultaneous EtherNet/IP sessions that the PLC can handle at any given point
in time, however, it does not impact the ability for Honeyd to advertise hosts.
An error rate threshold of 25% is selected because it is the approximate point
where both PLCs begins reducing the TCP window size, resulting in increased error
rates (see Figure 3.3). The results of the pilot study establishes reasonable data rates,
shown in Table 3.4.
The TCP connections for the HTTP protocol timed out (e.g., RST) if no data was
sent, and the PLC closed the connection gracefully (e.g., FIN, FIN-ACK, RST) at
the conclusion of each reply. It should be noted that the error rates of the web servers
on both PLCs was substantially higher than EtherNet/IP, particularly on the CP1L,
where the lowest error rate was approximately 60% (e.g., above the 25% threshold).
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Figure 3.3. Results of pilot study 3.
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An authentic network device has a unique identity (e.g., an IP address, MAC
address) that distinguishes it from other network devices. Serial numbers and host-
names are examples of other types of identifiers. Some identifiers, such as the device
make and model should remain constant; modifying these values would not apply in
this application. The unique identity must be consistent. When an attacker con-
nects to a device using a certain address and queries the device for its identity, the
response should consistently match what the attacker expects to see, specifically with
repetitive queries. Native Honeyd and PLCs both lack the capability to dynamically
change these values, however, the Honeyd source code can be modified to accomplish
this task. The following sections describe the modifications to Honeyd.
3.3.1 Adding Search Terms to the Honeyd Template Object.
The first modification to the Honeyd source code involves adding a linked list,
called proxy srchitem to the template structure in template.h. Each proxy srchitem
consists of a (char) find, (char) replace, and the respective (int) lengths of each. A
conceptual illustration of the modified template data structure is shown in Figure
3.4. Storing the search terms into each template’s data structure upon initializa-
tion will ensure the desired consistency. To clarify, consider a scenario where an
attacker connects to a target computer using a secure shell (i.e., ssh) to the IP ad-
dress 10.1.10.12. If the attacker were to then query the target with a command such
as ifconfig, they would expect the output to display the IP address 10.1.10.12.
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Repeated queries, or queries using alternate utilities (e.g., traceroute), should also
consistently display 10.1.10.12. If the attacker were to reconnect and attempt the
same commands at a later time, the output should still display 10.1.10.12.
Figure 3.4. Adding the linked list of search terms to the template structure.
3.3.2 Developing the Search Terms.
The file config.c contains the code that implements and administers the tem-
plates, which are stored in a splay tree object (defined in tree.h). The second modifi-
cation adds a new function proxy build srchlist() that initializes the proxy srchitem
list that was added to the template object.
Honeyd supports plug-in modules for enhanced functionality. The keyword option
triggers the configuration file parser to store the line of text into a linked list of
honeyd plugin cfgitem for use by plug-ins (see Figure 3.5). Immediately following
the option keyword option items is a plugin name. The name “icsproxy” is used
to identify the search terms in this modification.
In the file plugins config.c, a new function called plugins config find pkg items()
is created to extract the options denoted as “icsproxy” from the honeyd plugin cfgitem
into a separate consolidated list, leaving the original honeyd plugin cfgitem list un-
modified.
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Figure 3.5. The icsproxy options are parsed from the configuration file (top) into a
linked list (bottom) for later use.
The last step is to store the search and replace terms in each template in the tem-
plate tree. The new function proxy update srchlist(tmpl) in config.c iterates
through each search term in the icsproxy consolidated list and adds it to the template’s
search list. The associated replace term for the IP Address, MAC address, host name,
and serial number are calculated by utility functions that were added to config.c.
The utility functions take advantage of the data available within the template struc-
ture to generate the appropriate replace term. More protocol-specific calculated
search terms can be added to the switch() statement in proxy update srchlist
as required by specific implementations. Examples include data fields, such as a
description, location, or product code used by a particular protocol. The search
options can also handle static search and replace pairs, both ASCII text and raw
byte patterns. Once all of the templates are populated with their search and replace
terms, Honeyd completes some remaining initialization tasks, then begins listening
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for connections to any of the IP addresses that are bound to templates.
3.3.3 Search and Replace on the Payload.
A new file called icsproxy.c contains the search and replace functions, and was
inspired by code originally designed by Laird Shaw to provide a C equivalent to the
PHP function str replace() [28]. Shaw’s code leverages the standard C strstr
function to iteratively find all occurrences of the find string, and replaces them with
copies of another string. However, the implementation relies on NULL terminated
strings. In order to have the ability to search and replace the full range of binary
values, Shaw’s code is adapted to use specified string lengths instead of relying on
NULL terminated ASCII strings.
In order to achieve the inline search and replace functionality, a new function
processpayload() is inserted into tcp send() and udp send() in honeyd.c. The
processpayload() function provides a pointer to the appropriate template, the data
payload, and the payload length being handled. processpayload() iterates through
the template’s search list, calling the replace str() function for each set of search
and replace terms in the search list. A pointer to the modified payload is returned and
the sending function continues wrapping the modified payload into a TCP/IP packet
for transmission to its destination. Figure 3.6 illustrates the modifications applied to
the Honeyd architecture with the added find/replace list and payload modification
features.
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Figure 3.6. Anatomy of a Honeyd host with icsproxy modifications.
25
IV. Methodology
The evaluation approach of the Honeyd with icsproxy modifications, hereafter
referred to as Honeyd+, consists of a functional test and a performance test to evaluate
targetability. Section 4.1 describes the environment used to conduct the tests. Section
4.2 outlines the experimental design for the functional and performance tests. The
limitations of Honeyd+ are described in Section 4.3.
4.1 Test Environment
The test environment consists of a low-cost PLC (Omron CP1L with a CP1W-
EIP61 EtherNet/IP adapter) and a high-cost PLC (Allen-Bradley 1756-L61 Con-
trolLogix, with a 1756-EWEB module). Both PLCs use HTTP and the EtherNet/IP
industrial protocol. Honeyd+ is hosted on a low-cost computing platform (Raspberry
Pi running Raspbian, approximately $50) and a high-cost computing platform (HP
EliteBook 8570w Laptop running Ubuntu Server 14.04 LTS, approximately $1800).
Each Honeyd+ platform has two network interface cards, one is used for the
public-facing IP space, where the honeypots are deployed, and the other is configured
on the PLC VLAN for communication between the PLC and the Honeyd+ platform.
Both Honeyd+ platforms have two configuration files, one advertising 75 hosts of the
L61 template, and the other advertising 75 hosts of the CP1L template. The tests are
launched from an “attacker” PC running Kali-Linux from the public-facing IP space,
and the components are connected with a CISCO Catalyst 3550 switch configured
with inter-VLAN routing (see Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1. The evaluation environment.
4.2 Experimental Design
4.2.1 Functional Test.
The first test evaluates the authenticity of Honeyd+, using an Allen-Bradley L61
PLC and an OMRON CP1L PLC. Using the results from pilot testing, templates
are created for both PLCs that include search terms for IP address, MAC Address,
hostname, serial number, and the product name as a static search and replace pair
(See Appendix C). Honeydctl is a utility function included with Honeyd that provides
the operator the ability to monitor the status of Honeyd. An additional modification
to Honeyd+ enabled the ability to list the search terms in each template (See Figure
4.2).
The test procedure consists of using nmap to conduct a port scan and operating
system fingerprint of the physical PLC as well as the Honeyd+ hosts, running on
the Raspberry Pi and an HP Laptop platforms. Additionally, the wget [14] util-
ity downloads web pages with the HTTP protocol, and the nmap scripting engine
(NSE) enip-info script tests the proxy functionality on the EtherNet/IP protocol
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Figure 4.2. Validation of correct search terms within a template.
by sending the EtherNet/IP “ListIdentity” 0x0063 command [17].
The expected results are that the OS fingerprinting and port enumeration func-
tions are preserved, and that the search terms (i.e., IP address, MAC Address, host-
name, serial number, and product name) are consistently applied to give each decoy
a unique identity.
The tests are repeated three times, in random order, to evaluate consistency, to
account for error, and to reduce testing bias. The results are inspected, with the
assistance of the diff3 utility. The nmap and wget options that are used are shown
in Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Table 4.1. nmap options used for the functional test
Option Description




Scan specified TCP/UDP ports
-PE ICMP Echo probes
-PP ICMP Timestamp Probes
-A
Enable OS detection, version detection,
script scanning, and traceroute
-script "enip-info"
Use the NSE script ”enip-info”
(sends the ListIdentity command)
-T4 Aggressive timing
-vv Very verbose output
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Table 4.2. wget options used for the functional test
Option Description





The L61 requires iframes, determined
by checking the user agent. It redirects
the default ”Wget/1.13.4 (linux-gnu)” to
an error page, so the –user-agent switch
fools the L61 into serving up the web
page to a Firefox browser.
--max-redirect=1
Limits the maximum number of redirections
to one to keep the test within scope.
4.2.2 Performance Test.
The second test uses the Python performance testing script and the results from
pilot study 3 to evaluate the performance of hosting Honeyd+ on the PC and Rasp-
berry Pi platforms. The purpose of the test is to assess the impact of multiple
simultaneous connections to the PLC.
The performance test investigates the error rates, according to Equation 3.1, when
varying the factor level combinations of platform, protocol, and data rate. The re-
sponse variable is the ErrorRate, as defined in the pilot study. ErrorRate is as-
sessed according to the 25% threshold established in the pilot study, and the outcome
is expected to be consistent with the observations from the pilot study. Table 4.3
illustrates the experimental design, consisting of (1×3×2×Data RateL61)+(1×3×
2×Data RateCP1L) for a total of 48 factor-level combinations. The additional factor
(Data Rate) is being treated as a continuous variable, but is measured at discrete
intervals constrained by the fixed aggregate data rate.
The data rate is denoted as threads × requests per second (per thread). Each
thread represents a TCP connection to the PLC from the attacker, either simultaneous
connections directly to the PLC or through separate Honeyd+ hosts. There are five
levels for the L61 data rate, however there are only 3 levels for the CP1L because of
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the constraints discovered in the pilot study (e.g., maximum number of EtherNet/IP
sessions and the limited number of HTTP requests that it could handle). The test is
an incomplete factorial design, with replications because the levels of Data Rate are
not equally represented in all factor-level combinations, due to the limitations of the
factors PLC and Protocol.
The aggregate data rate is fixed to the values determined by pilot study 3 (Table
3.4). Each level of the variable Data Rate will increase the number of threads, while
lowering the data rate per thread to maintain the same aggregate rate. The number of
threads×data rate per thread is simply referred to as “rate” or “number of threads”
for the remainder of this research.
Each protocol, platform, and number of threads combination is measured 50 times
(n = 50) for a duration of 30 seconds each. To reduce bias, the PLC is rebooted prior
to starting each platform× rate measurement, and the order that the measurements
are performed is randomized. Each experiment is repeated three times (r = 3) for a
total of N = 7200 measurements.
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There are some limitations to consider prior to implementing Honeyd+. First,
the search and replace functionality was tested on protocols that use length-based
error checking, such as EtherNet/IP. Protocols that use encrypted or compressed
communications are not supported. Protocol-specific algorithms, such as error check-
ing, encryption, and compression could potentially be incorporated into the Honeyd+
source code, but is not in the scope of this research.
Provos demonstrated that a traditional implementation of Honeyd could support
2,000 TCP requests per second among 65,536 hosts [24]. The pilot study showed that
PLCs can support significantly less connections, depending on the manufacturer,
protocol, and model. Additionally, since multiple Honeyd+ hosts communicate with
a single PLC, any modifications or degradation of the PLC will immediately reflect
on all of the Honeyd+ hosts.
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V. Results and Analysis
The functional and performance tests completed successfully without complica-
tions, or discernible errors. The functional test demonstrated the authenticity of
Honeyd+ in all of the tested cases. The performance test focused on the targetability
characteristic of Honeyd+ and was successful in the lower data rates for the Ether-
Net/IP protocol, however error rates at the higher data rates were not optimal. The
HTTP protocol performance was inconclusive. Section 5.1 discusses the results of the
functional test, and Section 5.2 discusses the results of the performance test.
5.1 Functional Test
Advertising a subnet of 75 Honeyd+ hosts with the five search terms in Figure
5.1 (e.g., ipaddr, ethaddr, hostname, serial, hex) produced similar results as in Figure
3.1. Deeper examination of the nmap port enumeration and OS fingerprint, inspection
of the web pages, and the response from the ListIdentity command demonstrated
accurate and consistent application of the search terms in all cases and all repetitions,
denoted by a Xin Table 5.1. Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 highlight the changes on one of
the Honeyd+ hosts compared to the physical PLC on each of the tools tested.
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CP1L Baseline EtherNet/IP X X X X
HTML X X X X
PC EtherNet/IP X X X X
HTML X X X X
Pi EtherNet/IP X X X X
HTML X X X X
L61 Baseline EtherNet/IP X X X X
HTML X X X X
PC EtherNet/IP X X X X
HTML X X X X
Pi EtherNet/IP X X X X
HTML X X X X
(X= Accurate and consistent application of all search terms)
Figure 5.1. Search terms used in the authenticity test.
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Figure 5.2. nmap port enumeration and fingerprint: The actual PLC (left) and the
Honeyd+ host response (right).
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Figure 5.3. Web page response: the actual PLC web page (left) and the Honeyd+ host
web page(right).
Figure 5.4. The ListIdentity (0x0063) command via nmap NSE script: The actual PLC
(left) and the Honeyd+ host response (right).
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5.2 Performance Test
Overall, the EtherNet/IP protocol had an increased mean error rate at each level
across all of the platforms as the number of connections increased, despite the constant
aggregate data rate. For the HTTP protocol, the average mean error rate on the
L61 was higher–yet nearly identical–on the Raspberry Pi and PC platform than the
Baseline. The mean error rate for HTTP protocol on the CP1L was approximately
88% across all platforms, which is consistent with observations from the pilot test.
A summary of the results is shown Tables 5.2 and 5.3 and are plotted on interaction
plots in Figures 5.6-5.8; verbose data tables are in Appendix D. With the exception
of the CP1L-Baseline platform, the variances were all <1%.

















1x80 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1x20 87.66% 88.66% 88.73%
2x40 3.45% 0.18% 2.40% 2x10 85.77% 88.87% 89.14%
4x20 11.04% 28.36% 29.51% 4x5 86.77% 88.68% 88.93%
Total (avg) 4.83% 9.51% 10.64% Total (avg) 86.74% 88.74% 88.93%

















4x75 9.3% 11.4% 7.9% 1x50 0.7% 32.4% 32.1%
5x60 14.4% 16.4% 12.7% 2x25 0.1% 32.5% 32.2%
12x25 29.5% 30.1% 27.4% 5x10 14.1% 32.3% 31.9%
10x30 35.1% 36.2% 33.4% 10x5 18.0% 32.3% 31.9%
20x15 58.7% 63.9% 60.1% 25x2 54.1% 58.5% 57.4%
Total (avg) 29.4% 31.6% 28.3% Total (avg) 17.4% 37.6% 37.1%
5.2.1 Evaluation.
Evaluating the error rates of on the CP1L with the HTTP protocol (Figure 5.5)
against the 25% threshold showed a consistent error rate of approximately 88% on
all three platforms. The pilot study noted an approximate 60% error rate for the
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CP1L/HTTP combination; the outcome is higher than the 25% threshold is expected.
Figure 5.5. Interaction plots of error rate versus number of threads for the CP1L PLC
and HTTP protocol.
The HTTP protocol on the L61 (Figure 5.6) was inconsistent with the expectations
from the pilot study. The error rate on the baseline platform increased, though
remaining under the 25% threshold, until the highest rate (25 × 2). However, the
error rates for the Honeyd+ platforms were consistently 32% until reaching the 25×2
rate. The interaction plot indicates that there was no effect between either of the
Honeyd+ platforms and the physical PLC for the 1× 50 through the 10× 5 rates.
The EtherNet/IP Protocol on the CP1L (Figure 5.7) performed slightly better
than the pilot study, with the 1 × 80 and the 2 × 40 rates having error rates less
then 5%, however, the error rates for both of the Honeyd+ platforms exceeded the
25% threshold when the rate increased to 4× 20. At the 4× 20 rate, the CP1L PLC
still performed well under the threshold, with an 11% error rate. An observation for
further study is that the variance on the CP1L-Baseline seems to expand as the rate
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Figure 5.6. Interaction plots of error rate versus number of threads for the L61 PLC
and HTTP protocol.
increases, which does not occur with the CP1L Honeyd+ platforms or on the L61
platforms.
The EtherNet/IP Protocol on the L61 (Figure 5.8) showed a consistent increase
in error rate on all three platforms as the rate increased. Most noteworthy is that the
Raspberry Pi platform outperformed the baseline and the PC platforms on this test.
While this thesis offers no explanation for this finding, it should be further studied.
Overall, as the rate increased, all four PLC and rate combinations performed less
optimally than expected. The conclusion is that a PLC can support approximately 5
simultaneous connections—10 in the best case—at the 25% error rate threshold. The
results of the performance evaluation are summarized in Table 5.4.
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Figure 5.7. Interaction plots of error rate versus number of threads for the CP1L PLC
and EtherNet/IP protocol.
Figure 5.8. Interaction plots of error rate versus number of threads for the L61 PLC
and EtherNet/IP protocol.
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Table 5.4. Results of performance test.
Protocol Platform 1x80 2x40 4x20
EtherNet / IP CP1L-Baseline X X X
CP1L-PC X X X
CP1L-Pi X X X
1x20 2x10 4x5
HTTP CP1L-Baseline X X X
CP1L-PC X X X
CP1L-Pi X X X
Protocol Platform 4x75 5x60 10x30 12x25 20x15
EtherNet / IP L61-Baseline X X X X X
L61-PC X X X X X
L61-Pi X X X X X
1x50 2x25 5x10 10x5 25x2
HTTP L61-Baseline X X X X X
L61-PC X X X X X
L61-Pi X X X X X
X= Error Rate <25% X = Error Rate>25%
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VI. Conclusion
This chapter summarizes the overall conclusions of the research. Section 6.1
presents conclusions based on the results and analysis from Chapter 5. Section 6.2
discusses the significance of this research. Section 6.3 discusses recommendations and
approaches for future research.
6.1 Research Conclusions
The tests conducted in this research demonstrated that Honeyd+ could represent
75 authentic PLCs on both a laptop PC and a raspberry Pi, each containing 5 search
terms. Such a scale demonstrates significant cost savings over purchasing physical
equipment, and demonstrates targetability and authenticity. The results of the per-
formance test of Honeyd+ identified potential targetability limitations, though it is
still a cost saving alternative to deploying multiple physical honeypots.
6.1.1 Functional Test.
The functional test demonstrated that Honeyd+ could accurately identify five
search terms (IP Address, MAC Address, Host name, Serial Number, and Product
Name) and accurately replace them with appropriate values. The resulting decoys
have unique and consistent identities from the attacker’s perspective, resulting in a
high degree of authenticity.
6.1.2 Performance Test.
The PLCs supported less than ten simultaneous connections at its maximum
effective data rate, as defined and determined by a pilot study. Further study with
different devices, data rates, and protocols may discover a testing design with more
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optimal results. A Honeyd+ host does not communicate with the PLC unless an
attacker communicates with the port that is proxied to the PLC (i.e., Honeyd+ bears
a majority of the load for a port scan and OS fingerprint). Furthermore, performance
analysis revealed that the low-cost Raspberry Pi performed about the same–or better–
as a high cost laptop PC, making the Raspberry Pi the preferrable option to a low-cost
honeypot solution.
6.1.3 Research Hypothesis.
The results of the functional test confirms the hypothesis that Honeyd+ presents
an accurate representation of many PLCs. Figures 5.6-5.8 illustrates different perfor-
mance behaviors, based on protocol and device manufacturer. The hypotheses that
the performance limitations of a PLC is the limiting factor of performance in the
honeypot implementation is confirmed, though the practical impact is inconclusive.
Further study is required to quantify the impact to a production implementation.
An interesting contradiction to the initial research hypothesis is that the Rasperry Pi
platform performed equal to or better than the PC platform in all four tested cases.
6.2 Significance of Research
The authenticity of a physical PLC is ideal however, a single PLC can cost over
$5,000. The cost of implementing multiple highly authentic physical PLCs as honey-
pots quickly becomes prohibitive, which is a constraint on targetability. In contrast,
emulators can be replicated on various low-cost hardware platforms to gain a high
degree of targetability, but their authenticity is constrained to the features and be-
haviors contained in the programming code of the emulator. Lack of a standard
ICS virtualization environment further restricts the options to create ICS honeypots
that have a high degree of of authenticity and targetability with minumum risks and
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costs. This research demonstrated a technique that achieves both authenticity and
targetability, with a cost savings ranging from 5 honeypots (worst case) to 75 (best
case) decoy PLCs for the cost of a single PLC and a Raspberry Pi.
6.3 Future Work
6.3.1 Test Different PLCs Manufacturer Protocols.
This research tested the function and performance for two protocols each on two
different PLCs. Examination of additional devices and protocols using the method-
ology in this research can create a more comprehensive database of PLC templates
and may discover devices that perform better under a variety of circumstances.
6.3.2 Develop Additional Search Term Capabilities.
Honeyd+ demonstrated five basic search terms that are common to most net-
worked devices. Additional functions can be inserted into the source code to support
protocol specific algorithms (e.g., error checking, encryption, and compression) or
other desired data points for a specific implementation.
6.3.3 Compensate for the Limitations of the PLC.
Additional modifications or alternate techniques can compensate for the limita-
tions of the PLC. For example, substituting a script or separate web server for the
HTTP protocol. Another example would incorporating some form of caching func-
tionality or a stateful memory program to reduce the burden of repetitive communi-
cation with the PLC. Finally, it is possible to configure templates to proxy to more
than one PLC for a load balancing enhancement, although this technique could dilute
the desired cost benefits.
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6.3.4 Deploy on a Network.
Honeyd+ clearly has the potential application as the research honeypot. Honeyd+
inherited the additional capabilities of native Honeyd, such as simulating the routing
of multiple network segments. Other ICS components, such as HMI, sensors, or
actuators could be added to create a more comprehensive honeynet.
Bodenheim recommended deployment on an Amazon EC2 platform. Honeyd+
makes it feasible to pursue this research effort, assuming the additional cost of hosting
and IP space is acceptable.
Another potential application for Honeyd+ is a honeynet of decoys on a produc-
tion network. A Honeyd+ template on Raspberry Pi computers installed at multiple
remote sites could cloak the real assets while using one centrally located PLC (see
Figure 6.1). Such an application would increase an attacker’s chance of interact-
ing with a honeypot during the reconnaissance and enumeration stages, giving asset
owners an opportunity to respond to the intrusion.
Logging is an important consideration when deploying such a honeynet. Specific
logging capabilities were not considered in this research, however, Honeyd+ includes
the simple logging capability from native Honeyd that catalogs attempted connections
by source IP, source port, and operating system fingerprint. More verbose monitoring
on the centrally located PLC with available open source tools, such as Wireshark,
would enhance the logging with a full packet capture ability. A management tool,
such as Honeywall [8], can centralize the management of multiple honeypots into a
web-based interface with report generation capabilities.
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Figure 6.1. Potential implementation of Honeyd+ as a production honeynet.
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Appendix A. Nmap Results from Pilot Study 1
Verbose nmap fingerprint and enumeration of the CP1L PLC
# Nmap 6.40 scan initiated Mon Dec 1 19:59:26 2014 as: nmap -e eth0 -oA plc_scan_106 -sC -sS -sU -T4 -A -vv
-PE -PP -p* --script discovery --stats -every 30s 172.16.0.106
Pre -scan script results:
| broadcast -eigrp -discovery:
|_ ERROR: Couldn ’t get an A.S value.















| Description: Organization -Local Scope (rfc2365)
|_ Use the newtargets script -arg to add the results as targets
| broadcast -ping:
| IP: 172.16.0.108 MAC: 00:1d:9c:a3:dc:8d
| IP: 172.16.0.106 MAC: 00:1d:4b:f0 :22:66
|_ Use --script -args=newtargets to add the results as targets
| http -icloud -findmyiphone:
|_ ERROR: No username or password was supplied
| http -icloud -sendmsg:
|_ ERROR: No username or password was supplied
| targets -asn:
|_ targets -asn.asn is a mandatory parameter






Increasing send delay for 172.16.0.106 from 0 to 5 due to 71 out of 177 dropped probes since last increase.
Nmap scan report for 172.16.0.106
Host is up (0.0021s latency).
Scanned at 2014 -12 -01 19:59:38 EST for 737s
Not shown: 19850 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/ tcp open http?
|_http -chrono: Request times for /; avg: 16000.65 ms; min: 16000.52 ms; max: 16000.83 ms
|_http -comments -displayer: Couldn ’t find any comments.
|_http -default -accounts: [ERROR] HTTP request table is empty. This should not happen since we at least made
one request.
|_http -drupal -modules: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
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|_http -google -malware: [ERROR] No API key found. Update the variable APIKEY in http -google -malware or set it
in the argument http -google -malware.api
| http -grep:
|_ ERROR: Argument http -grep.match was not set
| http -headers:
|_ (Request type: GET)
| http -sitemap -generator:
| Directory structure:
| Longest directory structure:
| Depth: 0
| Dir: /
| Total files found (by extension):
|_
|_http -traceroute: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
| http -vhosts:
|_28 names had status ERROR
|_http -waf -detect: [ERROR] Initial HTTP request failed
|_http -wordpress -plugins: ERROR: Script execution failed (use -d to debug)
9999/ tcp open abyss?
44818/ tcp open EtherNet/IP -2?
69/ udp open tftp?
2222/ udp open|filtered msantipiracy
30718/ udp open|filtered unknown
44818/ udp open|filtered EtherNet/IP -2
3 services unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version , please submit the following
fingerprints at http ://www.insecure.org/cgi -bin/servicefp -submit.cgi :
============== NEXT SERVICE FINGERPRINT (SUBMIT INDIVIDUALLY)==============
SF-Port80 -TCP:V=6.40%I=7%D=12/1% Time =547 D0F42%P=x86_64 -unknown -linux -gnu%r
SF:( GetRequest ,38F,"HTTP /1\.1\ x20200\r\nContent -type:\ x20text/html\r\n\r\n
SF:<HTML ><HEAD ><TITLE >Omron\x20CP1W -EIP61\x20Configuration </TITLE ></HEAD ><
SF:BODY ><H2 >CP1W -EIP61\x20Configuration </H2 ><FORM\x20action =\" postcfg \.cgi
SF:\"\ x20method =\" post\">\n<TABLE >\n<TR >\n<TD>IP\x20Address :</TD >\n<TD><in
SF:put\x20type=text\x20name =\" ipaddr \"\ x20size =15\ x20maxlength =15\ x20value
SF :=172\.16\.0\.106 > </TD >\n</TR >\n<TR >\n<TD >Subnet\x20Mask:</TD >\n<TD><inp
SF:ut\x20type=text\x20name =\" subnet \"\ x20size =15\ x20maxlength =15\ x20value=
SF :255\.255\.255\.0 > </TD >\n</TR >\n<TR >\n<TD >Gateway:</TD >\n<TD ><input\x20t
SF:ype=text\x20name =\" gateway \"\ x20size =15\ x20maxlength =15\ x20value =0\.0\.
SF:0\.0></TD >\n</TR >\n<TR >\n<TD>FINS\x20UDP\x20Port:</TD >\n<TD ><input\x20t
SF:ype=text\x20name =\" finsudp \"\ x20size =15\ x20maxlength =5\ x20value =9600></
SF:TD >\n</TR >\n</TABLE >\n<P>Behavior\x20on\x20Loss\x20of\x20I/O\x20Connect
SF:ion:<BR >\n<input\x20type=radio\x20name =\" lost \"\ x20value =\" same \"\x20 >C
SF:IO\x20Outputs\x20Stay\x20the\x20Same <BR >\n<input\x20type=radio\x20name=
SF:\" lost \"\ x20value =\" zero \"\ x20checked >CIO\x20Outputs\x20Set\x20to\x20Ze
SF:ro<BR >\n<BR><INPUT\x20type =\" submit \"\ x20value =\"\ x20Apply\x20Setting\x
SF:20\"></FORM ></B");
============== NEXT SERVICE FINGERPRINT (SUBMIT INDIVIDUALLY)==============
SF-Port9999 -TCP:V=6.40%I=7%D=12/1% Time =547 D0F42%P=x86_64 -unknown -linux -gnu
SF:%r(NULL ,8F,"\xff\xfb\x03\xff\xfd\x18\r\n\r\n\0MAC\x20addre\xff\xfb\x03s
SF:s\x2000:1D:4B:F0 :22:66\r\nSoftware\x20version\x201 \.01\ x20\(Oct\x20\x20
SF:5\ x202011 \)\x20CP1W -EIP61\r\n\r\n\0Setup\x20Menu\r\n\r\nPress\x20Enter\
SF:x20to\x20go\x20into\x20Setup\x20Mode ")%r(GetRequest ,92,"\ xff\xfb\x03\xf
SF:f\xfd\x18\r\n\r\n\0MAC\x20addre\xff\xfb\x03ss\x2000 :1D:4B:F0 :22:66\r\nS
SF:oftware\x20version\x201 \.01\ x20\(Oct\x20\x205\x202011 \)\x20CP1W -EIP61\r
SF:\n\r\n\0Setup\x20Menu\r\n\r\nPress\x20Enter\x20to\x20go\x20into\x20Setu
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SF:p\x20Mode \?!\?")%r(HTTPOptions ,2C2 ,"\xff\xfb\x03\xff\xfd\x18\r\n\r\n\0M
SF:AC\x20addre\xff\xfb\x03ss\x2000:1D:4B:F0 :22:66\r\nSoftware\x20version\x
SF :201\.01\ x20\(Oct\x20\x205\x202011 \)\x20CP1W -EIP61\r\n\r\n\0Setup\x20Men
SF:u\r\n\r\nPress\x20Enter\x20to\x20go\x20into\x20Setup\x20Mode\r\n\n\0\*\
SF:*\*\ x20basic\x20parameters\x20\r\n\r\0 Hardware :\ x20Ethernet\x20TPI\r\n\
SF:0IP\x20addr\x20172 \.16\.0\.106\r\n\0 Netmask\x20255 \.255\.255\.0\r\n\0No
SF:\ x20Gateway\x20Set\r\n\r\n\0\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\ x20Chann
SF:el\x201\x20 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\r\n\r\0 Serial\x20Settings










SF:20\ x20\x20\x20\x20Your\x20choice\x20\?\x20")%r(FourOhFourRequest ,423 ,"\
SF:xff\xfb\x03\xff\xfd\x18\r\n\r\n\0MAC\x20addre\xff\xfb\x03ss\x2000 :1D:4B
SF::F0 :22:66\r\nSoftware\x20version\x201 \.01\ x20\(Oct\x20\x205\x202011 \)\x
SF:20CP1W -EIP61\r\n\r\n\0Setup\x20Menu\r\n\r\nPress\x20Enter\x20to\x20go\x
SF:20 into\x20Setup\x20Mode\r\n\n\0\*\*\*\ x20basic\x20parameters\x20\r\n\r\
SF:0 Hardware :\ x20Ethernet\x20TPI\r\n\0IP\x20addr\x20172 \.16\.0\.106\r\n\0N
SF:etmask\x20255 \.255\.255\.0\r\n\0No\x20Gateway\x20Set\r\n\r\n\0\*\*\*\*\
SF :*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\ x20Channel\x201\x20 \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*
SF :\*\*\*\*\r\n\r\0 Serial\x20Settings\x20\x20:\ x20115200\x20baud\x20\x20RS

















============== NEXT SERVICE FINGERPRINT (SUBMIT INDIVIDUALLY)==============
SF-Port69 -UDP:V=6.40%I=7%D=12/1% Time =547 D0F41%P=x86_64 -unknown -linux -gnu%r
SF:( DNSStatusRequest ,16 ,"\0\ x05 \0\ x04Invalid\x20Opcode :\x200 \0")%r(RPCChec
SF:k,1A,"\0\ x05\0\ x04Invalid\x20Opcode :\ x2029438 \0")%r(DNSVersionBindReq ,1
SF:6 ,"\0\ x05\0\ x04Invalid\x20Opcode :\x206 \0")%r(NBTStat ,1B,"\0\ x05\0\ x04In
SF:valid\x20Opcode :\x20 -32528\0")%r(Help ,1A,"\0\ x05 \0\ x04Invalid\x20Opcode
SF::\ x2026725 \0")%r(SIPOptions ,1A ,"\0\ x05 \0\ x04Invalid\x20Opcode :\ x2020304
SF:\0");
MAC Address: 00:1D:4B:F0 :22:66 (Grid Connect)




OS:7 D11DB%P=x86_64 -unknown -linux -gnu)SEQ(TS=U)ECN(R=N)T1(R=N)T2(R=N)T3(R=N)
OS:T4(R=N)T5(R=N)T6(R=N)T7(R=N)U1(R=Y%DF=N%T=40% IPL =38%UN=0% RIPL=G%RID=G%RI
OS:PCK=G%RUCK=G%RUD=G)U1(R=N)IE(R=N)
Network Distance: 1 hop
Host script results:
|_dns -brute: Can ’t guess domain of "172.16.0.106"; use dns -brute.domain script argument.
| firewalk:
| HOP HOST PROTOCOL BLOCKED PORTS
|_0 172.16.0.203 udp 2222 ,30718 ,44818
|_ipidseq: Unknown
| qscan:
| PORT FAMILY MEAN (us) STDDEV LOSS (%)
| 1 0 0.00 -0.00 100.0%
| 69 1 0.00 -0.00 100.0%
| 80 2 0.00 -0.00 100.0%
| 9999 3 0.00 -0.00 100.0%
|_44818 4 0.00 -0.00 100.0%
|_sniffer -detect: Unknown (tests: "________ ")
| traceroute -geolocation:
| HOP RTT ADDRESS GEOLOCATION
|_ 1 2.12 172.16.0.106 - ,-
TRACEROUTE
HOP RTT ADDRESS
1 2.12 ms 172.16.0.106
Read data files from: /usr/bin /../ share/nmap
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at http :// nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Mon Dec 1 20:11:55 2014 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 749.34 seconds
Verbose nmap fingerprint and enumeration of the L61 PLC
# Nmap 6.40 scan initiated Tue Dec 2 22:26:18 2014 as: nmap -e eth0 -oA plc_scan_105 -sC -sS -sU -T4 -A -vv
-PE -PP -p* --script discovery , enip -info --stats -every 30s 172.16.0.105
Pre -scan script results:
| broadcast -eigrp -discovery:
|_ ERROR: Couldn ’t get an A.S value.






|_ Use the newtargets script -arg to add the results as targets
| broadcast -ping:
| IP: 172.16.0.108 MAC: 00:1d:9c:a3:dc:8d
| IP: 172.16.0.105 MAC: 00:1d:9c:be :67:93
|_ Use --script -args=newtargets to add the results as targets
| http -icloud -findmyiphone:
|_ ERROR: No username or password was supplied
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| http -icloud -sendmsg:
|_ ERROR: No username or password was supplied
| targets -asn:
|_ targets -asn.asn is a mandatory parameter







Nmap scan report for 172.16.0.105
Host is up (0.0030s latency).
Scanned at 2014 -12 -02 22:26:29 EST for 302s
Not shown: 19853 closed ports
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
80/ tcp open http GoAhead -Webs httpd
| http -backup -finder:
| Spidering limited to: maxdepth =3; maxpagecount =20; withinhost =172.16.0.105
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../.. bak
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ editlimits.asp~
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../. copy./ editlimits.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../ Copy of ../ editlimits.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../ Copy (2) of ../ editlimits.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ editlimits.asp.1
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ editlimits.asp .~1~
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../.. bak
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ diagover.asp~
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../. copy./ diagover.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../ Copy of ../ diagover.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../ Copy (2) of ../ diagover.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ diagover.asp.1
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ diagover.asp .~1~
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../.. bak
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ dataviews.asp~
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../. copy./ dataviews.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../ Copy of ../ dataviews.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../ Copy (2) of ../ dataviews.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ dataviews.asp.1
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ dataviews.asp .~1~
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../.. bak
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ msgconnect.asp~
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../. copy./ msgconnect.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../ Copy of ../ msgconnect.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../ Copy (2) of ../ msgconnect.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ msgconnect.asp.1
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ msgconnect.asp .~1~
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../.. bak
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ serverlog.asp~
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../. copy./ serverlog.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../ Copy of ../ serverlog.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../ Copy (2) of ../ serverlog.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ serverlog.asp.1
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ serverlog.asp .~1~
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| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../.. bak
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ backupRestore.html~
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../. copy./ backupRestore.html
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../ Copy of ../ backupRestore.html
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../ Copy (2) of ../ backupRestore.html
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ backupRestore.html.1
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ backupRestore.html .~1~
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../.. bak
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ diagnetwork.asp~
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../. copy./ diagnetwork.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../ Copy of ../ diagnetwork.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../ Copy (2) of ../ diagnetwork.asp
| http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ diagnetwork.asp.1
|_ http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree /../../ diagnetwork.asp .~1~
|_http -chrono: Request times for /index.html; avg: 271.74 ms; min: 234.53 ms; max: 314.03 ms
| http -comments -displayer:
| Spidering limited to: maxdepth =3; maxpagecount =20; withinhost =172.16.0.105
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 141
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * CONTROLBUS * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ home.asp
| Line number: 27
| Comment:
| <!-- Start tab background -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 237
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * BROWSE CHASSIS * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 188
| Comment:
| <!-- <a class=" entry" onclick =" highlightView(this);" onmouseover =" overColor(this , ’#ffffff ’);"
onmouseout =" outColor(this , ’#bcbcbc ’);" href ="../ developersettings.asp" target ="home"><img src ="../
images/paper.gif" alt="">& nbsp;Developer Settings </a>
| -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ css/radevice.css
| Line number: 90
| Comment:
| /* Sortable table headers */
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 191
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * DEVICE CONFIGURATION * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 127
| Comment:
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| <!-- * * * SOCKET OBJECT * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ home.asp
| Line number: 86
| Comment:
| <!-- Begin right side column -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ home.asp
| Line number: 92
| Comment:
| <!--
| <table border =0 width ="100" height ="100" >
| <tr><td valign ="top">
| <img border ="0" src="/ images/display/r1c1.bmp"><br>
| <img src="/ images/display/r2c1.bmp"><img name="l0" id="l0" src ="/ images/display /0.bmp"><img name="
l1" id="l1" src ="/ images/display /0.bmp"><img name="l2" id="l2" src="/ images/display /0. bmp"><img name="
l3" id="l3" src ="/ images/display /0.bmp"><img src="/ images/display/r2c6.bmp"><br>
| <img src="/ images/display/r3c1.bmp"><br>
| <img src="/ images/display/r4c1.bmp"><img name="lnet" id="lnet" src ="/ images/display/led_off.bmp"><
img name="llink" id="llink" src="/ images/display/led_off.bmp"><img name="lmod" id="lmod" src="/ images/
display/led_off.bmp"><img src="/ images/display/r4c5.bmp"><br>
| <img src="/ images/display/r5c1.bmp"><br>




| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 241
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * MESSAGE BOARD * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ home.asp
| Line number: 152
| Comment:
| <!-- End body background -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 58
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * DATA VIEWS * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ home.asp
| Line number: 9
| Comment:
| <!--<script type="text/javascript" language =" JavaScript" src="/ scripts/XMLDOMWrapper.js"></script >
| <script type="text/javascript" language =" JavaScript" src="/ scripts/display.js"></script >
| -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ home.asp
| Line number: 16
| Comment:
| <!-- Start tabs -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ home.asp
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| Line number: 26
| Comment:
| <!-- End tabs -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 219
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * SERVER MANAGEMENT * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ home.asp
| Line number: 135
| Comment:
| <!-- End right side column -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 206
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * USER MANAGEMENT * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 245
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * EMAIL * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 242
| Comment:
| <!--
| <a class=" entry" onclick =" highlightView(this);" onmouseover =" overColor(this , ’#ffffff ’);"
onmouseout =" outColor(this , ’#bcbcbc ’);" id="/ msgboard/index.html" href ="../ msgboard/index.html" target
="home"><img src ="../ images/paper.gif" alt="">& nbsp;Message Board </a>
| -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 176
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * ADMINISTRATIVE SETTINGS * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ home.asp
| Line number: 140
| Comment:
| <!-- Do not modify below this point -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 109
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * NETWORK * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 155
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * MISCELLANEOUS * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ home.asp
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| Line number: 33
| Comment:
| <!-- Body starts here -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 96
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * ETHERNET/IP * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 86
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * ADVANCED DIAGNOSTICS * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 71
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * DIAGNOSTICS * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 54
| Comment:
| <!-- * * * HOME * * * -->
|
| Path: http ://172.16.0.105/ navtree/navtree.html
| Line number: 186
| Comment:
|_ <!-- * * * DEVELOPER SETTINGS * * * -->
|_http -drupal -modules:
| http -email -harvest:
| Spidering limited to: maxdepth =3; maxpagecount =20; withinhost =172.16.0.105
|_ abtech@prime -controls.com
| http -enum:
|_ /home.asp: Possible admin folder
|_http -favicon: Unknown favicon MD5: D9B704524A6DBEC6E55F47CC295BBB3A
|_http -google -malware: [ERROR] No API key found. Update the variable APIKEY in http -google -malware or set it
in the argument http -google -malware.api
| http -grep:
|_ ERROR: Argument http -grep.match was not set
| http -headers:
| Date: FRI JAN 02 02:45:54 1970
| Server: GoAhead -Webs
| Last -modified: SUN DEC 30 15:14:14 1979
| Content -length: 1177
| Content -type: text/html; charset=utf -8
| Connection: Close
|
|_ (Request type: GET)
| http -php -version: Logo query returned unknown hash 851 c258b740acece42f24de966ada285
|_Credits query returned unknown hash 851 c258b740acece42f24de966ada285
| http -sitemap -generator:
| Directory structure:
| /










| Longest directory structure:
| Depth: 1
| Dir: /css/
| Total files found (by extension):
|_ asp: 2; css: 1; gif: 3; html: 3; js: 1
| http -title: Rockwell Automation
|_Requested resource was http ://172.16.0.105/ index.html
| http -vhosts:
|_28 names had status 302
| http -waf -detect: IDS/IPS/WAF detected:
|_172 .16.0.105:80/? p4yl04d3=<script >alert(document.cookie)</script >
|_http -wordpress -plugins: nothing found amongst the 100 most popular plugins , use --script -args http -
wordpress -plugins.search=<number|all > for deeper analysis)
44818/ tcp open EtherNet -IP -2
| enip -info:
| Vendor: Rockwell Automation/Allen -Bradley (1)
| Product Name: 1756- EWEB
| Serial Number: 0x00932471
| Device Type: Communications Adapter (12)
| Product Code: 125
| Revision: 5.1
|_ Device IP: 172.16.0.105
2222/ udp open|filtered msantipiracy
44818/ udp open EtherNet -IP -2
| enip -info:
| Vendor: Rockwell Automation/Allen -Bradley (1)
| Product Name: 1756- EWEB
| Serial Number: 0x00932471
| Device Type: Communications Adapter (12)
| Product Code: 125
| Revision: 5.1
|_ Device IP: 172.16.0.105
MAC Address: 00:1D:9C:BE :67:93 (Rockwell Automation)
Device type: general purpose





OS:7 E8413%P=x86_64 -unknown -linux -gnu)SEQ(SP=9A%GCD =1%ISR=A1%TI=I%CI=I%TS=1)
OS:OPS(O1=M5B4NW0NNT11%O2=M5B4NW0NNT11%O3=M5B4NW0NNT11%O4=M5B4NW0NNT11%O5=M







OS:%UN=0% RIPL=G%RID=G%RIPCK=Z%RUCK =0% RUD=G)IE(R=N)
Uptime guess: 1.117 days (since Mon Dec 1 19:43:15 2014)
Network Distance: 1 hop
TCP Sequence Prediction: Difficulty =154 (Good luck!)
IP ID Sequence Generation: Incremental
Host script results:
|_dns -brute: Can ’t guess domain of "172.16.0.105"; use dns -brute.domain script argument.
| firewalk:
| HOP HOST PROTOCOL BLOCKED PORTS
|_0 172.16.0.203 udp 2222
|_ipidseq: Randomized
|_path -mtu: PMTU == 1500
| qscan:
| PORT FAMILY MEAN (us) STDDEV LOSS (%)
| 1 0 988.80 279.05 0.0%
| 80 1 1393.60 337.47 0.0%
| 44818 1 1514.30 468.07 0.0%
|_44818 1 1381.70 276.78 0.0%
| traceroute -geolocation:
| HOP RTT ADDRESS GEOLOCATION
|_ 1 2.98 172.16.0.105 - ,-
TRACEROUTE
HOP RTT ADDRESS
1 2.98 ms 172.16.0.105
Read data files from: /usr/bin /../ share/nmap
OS and Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at http :// nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Tue Dec 2 22:31:31 2014 -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 313.81 seconds
57












IS_AB = True ## True for Allen -Bradley , False for OMRON
IS_CONTROL = True ## True for ControlLogix , False for MicroLogix
CIP_SEND_SIZE = 0 ## SEND_SIZE = msg + hdr











if IS_AB: ## MICRO
CIP_SEND_SIZE = 112
CIP_RECV_SIZE = 144







def connect(self , ip, port , slot):
self.recvct = 0
self.error = 0
log = logging.getLogger(’ENIP:Connect ’)
status = 0
self.sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET , socket.SOCK_STREAM)
self.sock.setsockopt(socket.IPPROTO_TCP , socket.TCP_NODELAY , 1)
try:




except Exception , e:











self.conID = self.large_forward_open ()
def send(self , packet):
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except Exception , e:
log.error(’Error sending packet \n\t Message :%s’ % e)
return bytes_sent
def recv(self):
ready = select.select ([self.sock], [], [], 0)
if ready [0]:
response = self.sock.recv (65535)
else:
response = None
# Populate the object with the data (66+)
# self.command = response [0:1]
# self.length = response [2:3]
# self.shandle = response [4:8]
# self.status = response [9:12]
# self.sContext = response [13:21]
# self.options = response [22:25]
# self.intHandle = response [26:30]
# self.timeout = response [31:32]
# self.iCount = response [33:34]
# self.typeID1 = response [35:36]
# self.length1 = response [37:38]
# self.typeID2 = response [39:40]
# self.Length2 = response [41:42]
# self.service = response [43]
# self.status = response [44:45]
# self.data = response [46:]
return response
def collect(self , obj , tm):








## print "receiving for " + str(exittime) + " seconds ..."
while (stilltime):
# receving 68 bytes +
# 66 additional bytes = TCP header (32) + IP header (20) + Ethernet Frame (14)
data = obj.recv()
## log.debug(’----- LOAD TEST COLLECT : ----- \n\t Recv: %s ’ % data)
if not data is None:
tempbuf += data
while not tempbuf is None:
pkt_start = tempbuf.find(’\x6F\x00 ’)
if pkt_start == -1:
break
pkt_end = tempbuf.find(’\x6F\x00 ’, pkt_start +2)
if pkt_end == -1:
break
else:
response = tempbuf[pkt_start:pkt_end -1]
tempbuf = tempbuf[pkt_end: ]
log.debug(’----- LOAD TEST CHECK: ----- buf %i \t pkt_start %i \t pkt_end %i \n\t Checking response:





stilltime = (elapsedtime < exittime)
if (not stilltime) and (tempbuf): ## do one more check for a "dangling packet" before exiting
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pkt_start = tempbuf.find(’\x6F\x00 ’)
if pkt_start != -1:
log.debug(’----- LAST LOAD TEST CHECK: ----- buf %i \t pkt_start %i \t pkt_end %i \n\t Checking
response: %s’ % (len(tempbuf), pkt_start , pkt_end , response.encode(’hex ’)))
response = tempbuf[pkt_start:len(tempbuf) -1]
if self.checkpacket(response):
self.recvct += 1
def checkpacket(self , response):
log = logging.getLogger(’ENIP:checkpacket ’)
if response is None:
return
len_response = len(response) + HDR_RCV_LEN
response = response.encode(’hex ’)
log.debug(’----- LOAD TEST: ----- \n\t Recv: %s %s %s %s %s’
% (response [0:4], response [4:8] , response [8:16] , response [16:24] , response [24:]))
if (len_response == CIP_RECV_SIZE):
if(response [82:86]== ’0000 ’): # CIP Success message is 0000
## self.recvct += 1
log.debug(’\t[+] Validated receipt ’)
return True
else:
log.debug(’\t[x] Error message received\n\t %s’ % response [82:86])
## self.error += 1
else:
log.debug(’\t[x] Unexpected response (length: %i, expected: %i)\n\t %s’ % (len_response , CIP_RECV_SIZE
, response))
## self.error += 1
return False
def wrapUnconnectedSend(self , message , route):
# Service and meta data
result = ’5202200624010299 ’. decode(’hex ’)
# Message req size in bytes (2 bytes)
result = result + struct.pack(’<H’, len(message))
# Message
result = result + message
# Length of route (technically only 1 byte , but the other will
# always be zero anyway
result = result + struct.pack(’<H’, len(route)/2)
result = result + route
return result
def getPathOnBack(self , slot):
#req2 = ’0101120 f3139322e3136382e3130382e32313000 ’. decode(’hex ’)
result = ’\x01 ’ + struct.pack(’B’, slot)
return result
def register_session (self):




response = self.sock.recv (1024)
if response:
self.session = response [4:8]
else:
self.session = None
response = response.encode(’hex ’)
reg = reg.encode(’hex ’)
log.debug(’REGISTER SESSION: %i \n\t Mesg: %s %s %s %s %s \n\t Resp: %s %s %s %s %s’
% (len(response), reg [0:4] , reg[4:8], reg [8:16] , reg [16:24] , reg[24:],
response [0:4], response [4:8], response [8:16] , response [16:24] , response [24:]))
return self.session
def getAttributeAll(self , cls , inst):
packet = ’\x01\x02\x20 ’ + struct.pack(’B’, cls) + ’\x24 ’ + struct.pack(’B’, inst)
return packet
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def wrapENIPHeader(self , packet , command=’\x70\x00 ’):
context = struct.pack(’<Q’, self.context)
self.context += 1
leng = struct.pack(’<H’, len(packet))
status = ’\x00 ’*4
options = ’\x00\x00\x00\x00 ’
header = command + leng + self.session + status + context + options
return header + packet
# Assumes CIP
def wrapENIP(self , itemtype , item , itemtype2=None , item2=None , command=’\x70\x00 ’):
count = 1
packet = struct.pack(’<H’, itemtype)
packet += struct.pack(’<H’, len(item))
packet += item
if not (itemtype2 is None or item2 is None):
count = 2
packet += struct.pack(’<H’, itemtype2)
packet += struct.pack(’<H’, len(item2))
packet += item2
# Interface handle and timeout
packet = ’\x00 ’ * 4 + ’\x0a\x00 ’ + struct.pack(’<H’, count) + packet
return self.wrapENIPHeader(packet , command)
class loadThread (threading.Thread):







self.totals = (0, 0, 0)
def run(self):
# log = logging.FileHandler(self.name+’_verbose.log ’)
# log.setLevel(logging.DEBUG)
# logging.getLogger(’’).addHandler(log)
log = logging.getLogger(’loadThread:run ’)
log.debug(’Starting thread %s’ % self.name)
# Get lock to synchronize threads
# threadLock.acquire ()
self.tstart = time.time()
self.totals = LoadTest(self.tgtIP , self.tgtPort , self.duration , self.rate)
self.tfinish = time.time()
ttime = self.tfinish -self.tstart
self.totals += (ttime - RCV_WAIT , ) ## Ignore the 5 second RECV() wait time
log.info(’ [+] Thread %s done in %.4f sec \n\t #err: %i \t send: %.2f \t recv: %.2f (bytes)’
% (self.name , self.totals [3], self.totals [0], self.totals [1], self.totals [2]))









d = e.getAttributeAll(cls , att)
# ENIP header
d = e.wrapENIP(0, ’’, 0xB2 , d, command=’\x6f\x00 ’)
e.send(d)
reply = e.recv().encode(’hex ’)
# reply = e.recv()
e.close()
return reply
def LoadTest(tgtIP , tgtPort , tm, pps):









if not obj.connect(tgtIP , tgtPort , 0):
log.debug(’No connection. Breaking ’)
return (0,0,0)
# CIP portion
frame = obj.getAttributeAll (1,1)
# ENIP header
if IS_CONTROL:
frame = obj.wrapUnconnectedSend(frame , obj.getPathOnBack (0))
frame = obj.wrapENIP(0, ’’, 0xB2 , frame , command=’\x6f\x00 ’)
frame_hex = frame.encode(’hex ’)
if pps == 0: # Unlimited packet rate
pps = 1000000
pkt_sleep = 1.0 / pps





while curr < (starttime + tm):
sec = curr + 1
sendct = 0
sleeptime = pkt_sleep
while (curr <= sec):
if (sendct < pps):
# Sending 46 bytes / receive 70 in return , plus
# 66 additional bytes = TCP header (32) + IP header (20) + Ethernet Frame (14)
pkt_start = time.time()
while ((time.time() - pkt_start) < sleeptime):
#log.debug(’Sleeping it off ..... START %.5f / NOW %.5f / UNTIL %.5f’ % (pkt_start , ((time.time()
- pkt_start)), sleeptime))
pass
send = obj.send(frame) + HDR_SEND_LEN
log.debug(’----- LOAD TEST: ----- TIME\t%.5f \n\t Sent: %s %s %s %s %s’
% (pkt_start , frame_hex [0:4], frame_hex [4:8] , frame_hex [8:16] , frame_hex [16:24] , frame_hex
[24:]))
if send != CIP_SEND_SIZE:







pkt_fin = time.time() - pkt_start
sleeptime = pkt_sleep - pkt_fin




## log.info(’waiting for recv() threads to close ...’)
rcv.join()
recvct += obj.recvct
## print "Leaving LoadTest ( Errors: ", error , "Sent Ct: ", sendttl , " / Recv Ct: ", recvct , ")"
error += obj.error + (sendttl - obj.recvct) ## Errors are Invalid responses + No responses
r_total = recvct * CIP_RECV_SIZE ## Successful receives count * response size (need to verify)
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obj.close()
## print "Leaving LoadTest (Err: ", error , " / Sent: ", s_total , " / Recv: ", r_total , ")"
return(error , s_total , r_total)
def FindMaxSessions(tgtIP , tgtPort):






obj.connect(tgtIP , tgtPort , 0)
if (not obj.session):
log.debug(’\t[X] No Session Received ....’)
break
conn.append(obj)
log.debug(’Registering session #: %i \tID: %s’ % (i, obj.session.encode(’hex ’)))
# time.sleep (5)
#
# for i in range(0, 10):
# obj = conn.pop()




# i = 0
#
# while True:
# i += 1
# obj = ENIP()
# obj.connect(tgtIP , tgtPort , 0)
# if not obj.session:
# print "No session received ..."
# break
# conn.append(obj)




for i in range(0, len(conn)):
obj = conn.pop()







description ="A load testing program for Allen Bradely L61 Controller",
)
## Required arguments
parser.add_argument ("tgtIP", help="IP Address of target (proxied) device ")
parser.add_argument (" tgtPort", help="TCP Port of target (proxied) device", type=int)
## Optional arguments
parser.add_argument ("-f","--filename", help="Base file name for logging (will append _verbose.log and
_console.log , default: benchtest", type=str)
parser.add_argument ("-d", "--duration", help=" Duration of each test (seconds), default: 60s", type=int)
parser.add_argument ("-r","--rate", help="Rate of packets per second to send , default: 50pps", type=int)
parser.add_argument ("-t","--min -threads", help=" Number of threads to start testing , default: 1", type=int)
parser.add_argument ("-T","--max -threads", help=" Number of threads to test up to, default: MAX", type=int)
parser.add_argument ("-v","--variation", help="Type of equipment under test ABC=ControlLogix ABM=MicroLogix
or OM=OMRON", type=str)

























if args.variation == ’ABC ’:
IS_AB = True
IS_CONTROL = True
elif args.variation == ’ABL ’:
IS_AB = True
IS_CONTROL = False
elif args.variation == ’OM ’:
IS_AB = False
IS_CONTROL = False
return args.tgtIP , args.tgtPort , args.duration , args.rate , threads_min , threads_max , filename
def main():
## tgtIP = ’192.168.0.119 ’
## tgtPort = 44818
## cls = 1
## att = 1
tgtIP , tgtPort , duration , rate , threads_min , threads_max , logfile = getArgs ()
cls = 1 # CIP Class
att = 1 # CIP Attribute
runtime = time.time()
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO ,




console = logging.StreamHandler ()
console.setLevel(logging.INFO)
file = logging.FileHandler(logfile+’_console.log ’)
file.setLevel(logging.INFO)





log = logging.getLogger(’main -main ’)
SetSizes ()
## Start tcpdump HERE
log.info(’Testing started at %s’ % time.asctime(time.localtime(time.time())))
log.info(’\tIS_AB: %s / IS_CONTROL: %s \t CIP_SEND_SIZE: %i / CIP_RECV_SIZE %i / HDR_SEND_LEN %i /
HDR_RCV_LEN %i’ % (IS_AB , IS_CONTROL , CIP_SEND_SIZE , CIP_RECV_SIZE , HDR_SEND_LEN , HDR_RCV_LEN))
#### Prerequisite: Verify connectivity ################################################
## log.info(’>> Verifying connectivity with sendPacket ...’)
##
## # self.command = response [0:4] ENIP Header
## # self.length = response [4:8]
## # self.shandle = response [8:16]
## # self.status = response [16:24
## # self.sContext = response [24:40]
## # self.options = response [40:48]
## # self.intHandle = response [48:56]
## # self.timeout = response [56:60]
## # self.iCount = response [60:64]
## # self.typeID1 = response [64:68]
## # self.length1 = response [68:72]
## # self.typeID2 = response [72:76]
## # self.Length2 = response [76:80]
## # self.service = response [80:82] CIP Message
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## # self.status = response [82:86]
## # self.data = response [86:]
##
## packet = sendPacket(tgtIP , tgtPort , cls , att)
## log.debug(’Good message: \n\t [ENIP]\t %s %s %s %s %s \n\t [CIP]\t %s %s %s’ % \
## (packet [0:4], packet [4:8], packet [8:16] , packet [16:24] , packet [24:80] , \
## packet [80:82] , packet [82:86] , packet [86:]))
##
## packet = sendPacket(tgtIP , tgtPort , cls , 16)
## log.debug(’Error message: \n\t [ENIP]\t %s %s %s %s %s \n\t [CIP]\t %s %s %s’ % \
## (packet [0:4], packet [4:8], packet [8:16] , packet [16:24] , packet [24:80] , \
## packet [80:82] , packet [82:86] , packet [86:]))
##
###### Test 1: Find max sessions ########################################################
## log.info(’>> Running FindMaxSessions ...’)
## maxsessions = FindMaxSessions(tgtIP , tgtPort)
##
## log.info(’\t Maximum sessions: \t %i’ % maxsessions)
##
#### Test 2: Find max throughput in a session #########################################
# duration = 60 # length of test in seconds
# rate = 50 # packets per second (0 = MAX; 62-65 = Effective MAX)
# totals = (0, 0, 0)
#
# log.info(’>> Running single instance of LoadTest for %i seconds (@ %i pps)...’ % (duration , rate))
#
# totals = LoadTest(tgtIP , tgtPort , duration , rate)
# log.info(’\t Errors: \t\t %i \n\t Avg rate (send): \t %.2f bytes/sec \n\t Avg rate (recv): \t %.2f bytes/
sec ’ \
# % (totals [0], (totals [1]/ duration), (totals [2]/ duration)))
#
## Test 3: Find max throughput with multiple sessions ###############################
# numthreads = 3 # number of concurrent threads
if threads_max == 0: threads_max = maxsessions # number of concurrent threads
totalstable =[]
extime = 0
for j in range(threads_min , threads_max +1):
totals = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
log.info(’>> Starting threaded LoadTest with %i / %i threads for %i seconds (@ %i pps)...’ \
% (j, threads_max , duration , rate))
starttime = time.time()
# Create new threads
for i in range (1, j+1):
thrID = logfile + ’_’ + ‘j‘ + ’.’ + ‘i‘
thread = loadThread(thrID , tgtIP , tgtPort , duration , rate)
thread.start()
threads.append(thread)
wait = 0.1 * random.random ()
log.info (’[*] Stagger time for thread %i: %.3f sec ’ % (i, wait))
time.sleep(wait)
# Wait for all threads to complete
for t in threads:
returned = t.join()
totals = (totals [0] + returned [0], totals [1] + returned [1], totals [2] + returned [2], totals [3] +
returned [3])
extime = time.time()-starttime
totals += (extime , )
totalstable.append(totals)
log.info(’ --- Round %i summary ------------------ \n\t Elapsed Time: \t\t %.4f sec \n\t Errors: \t\t
%i \n\t Avg rate (send): \t %.2f bytes/sec \n\t Avg rate (recv): \t %.2f bytes/sec \n\t Avg thread
time: \t %.4f sec ’
% (j, extime ,
totals [0],
(totals [1]/( totals [3]/j)),
(totals [2]/( totals [3]/j)),
totals [3]/j))
# log.debug(’Thread pool BEFORE: \t %s’ % threads)
# Empty the list of threads to avoid residual data
while len(threads) > 0 : threads.pop()
# log.debug(’Thread pool AFTER: \t %s’ % threads)




for j in range(0, 1+( threads_max -threads_min)):
print j+threads_min , "\t", duration , "\t", rate , "\t", totalstable[j][0], "\t", (totalstable[j][1]/
CIP_SEND_SIZE), "\t", (totalstable[j][2]/ CIP_RECV_SIZE) ,"\t",( totalstable[j][1]/( totalstable[j
][3]/(j+threads_min))), "\t", (totalstable[j][2]/( totalstable[j][3]/(j+threads_min))), "\t", (
totalstable[j][3]/(j+threads_min)), "\t", totalstable[j][4]
endtime = time.time()
log.info(’Load test completed at %s -- Total elapsed time: %i sec ’ % (time.asctime(time.localtime(time.
time())), endtime -runtime))
## Stop tcpdump HERE
if __name__ == ’__main__ ’:
main()
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Appendix C. PLC Templates
L61.conf: Allen-Bradley L61 PLC
######################################################################
#... DEFAULT TEMPLATE ................................................
# honeyd will dynamically clone the default template for any IP




set default personality "VxWorks"
set default ethernet "Rockwell Automation"
# set default default icmp action open
set default default tcp action reset
add default tcp port 80 proxy 172.16.0.105:80
add default tcp port 44818 proxy 172.16.0.105:44818
add default udp port 44818 proxy 172.16.0.105:44818
add default udp port 2222 proxy 172.16.0.105:2222
set default default udp action block
######################################################################
#... INVIS TEMPLATE ..................................................
# the invis template is used to exclude other hosts (e.g. production hosts)
# that already exist on the network.
######################################################################
create invis
set invis default tcp action block
set invis default udp action block




#... ADDITIONAL TEMPLATES ............................................
# Additional unique templates can be defined here. Multiple IP
# addresses can be bound to a single template
######################################################################
create L61
set L61 personality "VxWorks"
set L61 ethernet "Rockwell Automation"
set L61 default tcp action reset
set L61 default udp action reset
set L61 default icmp action open
add L61 tcp port 80 proxy 172.16.0.105:80
add L61 tcp port 44818 proxy 172.16.0.105:44818
add L61 udp port 44818 proxy 172.16.0.105:44818










#... ICSPROXY options ................................................
# The options for the ICSPROXY functionality are split into a separate
# file , for clarity.
######################################################################
## honeyd configuration parsing uses these REGEX to cast types to options (STRING|FLOAT|INT [NUMBER ])
## [0-9]+ { yylval.number = atoi(yytext); return NUMBER; }
## [0 -9]+\.[0 -9]+ { yylval.floatp = atof(yytext); return FLOAT; }
## [\$A -Za-z][\.\(\) \/A-Za -z_\-0-9\*]* { yylval.string = strdup(yytext); return STRING; }
######################################################################
######################################################################
## ... COMPUTED OPTIONS ..............................................
## The following options are "find" criteria , and the associated
## "replace" terms are computed using template -specific properties when
## the search list is populated into each template.
######################################################################
## ’ip’ is a keyword , so use ipaddr instead.
## Force the interpretation of the dotted decimal notation as a string with a "$" at the beginning
option icsproxy ipaddr $172 .16.0.105
## ’ethernet ’ is a keyword , so use ethaddr instead.
## Force the interpretation of the dotted decimal notation as a string with a "$" at the beginning.
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## Also use dashes (-) instead of colons (:) to separate the MAC address
option icsproxy ethaddr $00 -1D-9C-BE -67-93
option icsproxy hostname $eWeb_xxx
option icsproxy serial $00932471
# Pass binary patterns with the prefix $(hex)
option icsproxy $(hex)313735362 d45574542 $(hex)3534313900393324716768
# option icsproxy 1 7 5 6 - E W E B 5 4 1 9\x 9 3 $ q C D
######################################################################
## ... ADDITIONAL OPTIONS ............................................
## Additional [static] find/replace criteria can be specified using the
## following syntax:
## OPTION ICSPROXY <FIND > <REPLACE >
######################################################################
# option icsproxy plc.water.s5 plc.water.A0
# option icsproxy site facility
# option icsproxy interest bail
option dummy test1 test2
option dummy test3 test4
option dummy test5 test6
option check test1 test2
option check test3 test4
option check test5 test6
CP1L.conf: Omron CP1L PLC
######################################################################
#... DEFAULT TEMPLATE ................................................
# honeyd will dynamically clone the default template for any IP




set default personality "VxWorks"
set default ethernet "Rockwell Automation"
# set default default icmp action open
set default default tcp action reset
add default tcp port 80 proxy 172.16.0.105:80
add default tcp port 44818 proxy 172.16.0.105:44818
add default udp port 44818 proxy 172.16.0.105:44818
add default udp port 2222 proxy 172.16.0.105:2222
set default default udp action block
######################################################################
#... INVIS TEMPLATE ..................................................
# the invis template is used to exclude other hosts (e.g. production hosts)
# that already exist on the network.
######################################################################
create invis
set invis default tcp action block
set invis default udp action block




#... ADDITIONAL TEMPLATES ............................................
# Additional unique templates can be defined here. Multiple IP
# addresses can be bound to a single template
######################################################################
create CP1L
set CP1L personality "HP iLO 2 remote management interface"
set CP1L ethernet "Grid Connect"
set CP1L default tcp action reset
set CP1L default udp action reset
set CP1L default icmp action open
add CP1L tcp port 80 proxy 172.16.0.106:80
add CP1L tcp port 9999 proxy 172.16.0.106:9999
add CP1L tcp port 44818 proxy 172.16.0.106:44818
add CP1L udp port 44818 proxy 172.16.0.106:44818
add CP1L udp port 69 proxy 172.16.0.106:69
add CP1L udp port 2222 proxy 172.16.0.106:2222
add CP1L udp port 9600 proxy 172.16.0.106:9600
add CP1L udp port 30718 proxy 172.16.0.106:30718










#... ICSPROXY options ................................................
# The options for the ICSPROXY functionality are split into a separate
# file , for clarity.
######################################################################
## honeyd configuration parsing uses these REGEX to cast types to options (STRING|FLOAT|INT [NUMBER ])
## [0-9]+ { yylval.number = atoi(yytext); return NUMBER; }
## [0 -9]+\.[0 -9]+ { yylval.floatp = atof(yytext); return FLOAT; }
## [\$A -Za-z][\.\(\) \/A-Za -z_\-0-9\*]* { yylval.string = strdup(yytext); return STRING; }
######################################################################
######################################################################
## ... COMPUTED OPTIONS ..............................................
## The following options are "find" criteria , and the associated
## "replace" terms are computed using template -specific properties when
## the search list is populated into each template.
######################################################################
## ’ip’ is a keyword , so use ipaddr instead.
## Force the interpretation of the dotted decimal notation as a string with a "$" at the beginning
option icsproxy ipaddr $172 .16.0.106
## ’ethernet ’ is a keyword , so use ethaddr instead.
## Force the interpretation of the dotted decimal notation as a string with a "$" at the beginning.
## Also use dashes (-) instead of colons (:) to separate the MAC address
option icsproxy ethaddr $00 -1D-4B-F0 -22-66
option icsproxy hostname $CP1W -EIP61
option icsproxy serial $4bf02266
# Pass binary patterns with the prefix $(hex)
# option icsproxy C P 1 W - E I P 6 1 R J 5 X ! N Q A 9 2
option icsproxy $(hex)435031572 d4549503631 $(hex)524 a3558214e51413932
######################################################################
## ... ADDITIONAL OPTIONS ............................................
## Additional [static] find/replace criteria can be specified using the
## following syntax:
## OPTION ICSPROXY <FIND > <REPLACE >
######################################################################
# option icsproxy plc.water.s5 plc.water.A0
# option icsproxy site facility
# option icsproxy interest bail
option dummy test1 test2
option dummy test3 test4
option dummy test5 test6
option check test1 test2
option check test3 test4
option check test5 test6
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Appendix D. Performance Test Raw Data
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Table 4.1. Summary Statistics (verbose) for the L61, EtherNet/IP Protocol
Platform
(ENIP)
rate Repetition Mean StdDev Var Min Max
Baseline-L61 10x30 run1 29.46% 1.71% 0.03% 26.19% 33.74%
run2 29.80% 1.76% 0.03% 24.97% 36.30%
run3 32.82% 1.39% 0.02% 29.58% 35.64%
12x25 run1 35.09% 1.44% 0.02% 31.89% 37.88%
run2 35.65% 2.34% 0.05% 32.33% 49.03%
run3 38.57% 1.61% 0.03% 35.51% 45.00%
20x15 run1 58.69% 1.63% 0.03% 55.36% 62.82%
run2 59.13% 1.88% 0.04% 55.28% 63.77%
run3 62.20% 1.96% 0.04% 55.76% 65.77%
4x75 run1 9.28% 1.42% 0.02% 4.48% 15.37%
run2 9.09% 0.83% 0.01% 7.09% 11.06%
run3 9.22% 1.13% 0.01% 6.22% 12.58%
5x60 run1 14.41% 1.86% 0.03% 11.18% 22.78%
run2 14.19% 1.48% 0.02% 11.41% 20.86%
run3 14.71% 1.14% 0.01% 13.00% 17.44%
PC-L61 10x30 run1 30.06% 1.88% 0.04% 26.39% 34.82%
run2 30.93% 1.79% 0.03% 27.42% 34.64%
run3 34.44% 1.86% 0.03% 30.96% 39.34%
12x25 run1 36.18% 1.68% 0.03% 32.80% 40.84%
run2 36.72% 1.64% 0.03% 33.71% 40.38%
run3 40.58% 1.72% 0.03% 36.13% 43.03%
20x15 run1 63.86% 1.82% 0.03% 58.39% 68.33%
run2 63.95% 1.66% 0.03% 60.09% 67.68%
run3 67.80% 1.95% 0.04% 62.72% 72.40%
4x75 run1 11.37% 2.15% 0.05% 9.52% 23.74%
run2 11.48% 2.28% 0.05% 9.44% 23.40%
run3 11.40% 1.35% 0.02% 8.72% 18.20%
5x60 run1 16.36% 1.53% 0.02% 14.00% 23.34%
run2 16.14% 0.99% 0.01% 14.30% 18.99%
run3 16.51% 1.11% 0.01% 14.48% 18.80%
Pi-L61 10x30 run1 27.45% 1.98% 0.04% 23.73% 33.84%
run2 28.06% 1.85% 0.03% 23.00% 31.52%
run3 31.82% 3.08% 0.09% 28.92% 50.50%
12x25 run1 33.44% 1.35% 0.02% 29.20% 36.06%
run2 33.71% 1.62% 0.03% 29.10% 37.81%
run3 36.98% 1.61% 0.03% 33.77% 40.13%
20x15 run1 60.06% 2.45% 0.06% 55.78% 71.80%
run2 59.85% 1.59% 0.03% 55.06% 62.80%
run3 63.34% 2.30% 0.05% 54.71% 67.00%
4x75 run1 7.88% 1.07% 0.01% 5.32% 10.28%
run2 7.65% 1.19% 0.01% 4.18% 10.62%
run3 7.58% 0.97% 0.01% 5.16% 10.00%
5x60 run1 12.65% 1.37% 0.02% 10.69% 15.48%
run2 12.44% 1.07% 0.01% 10.11% 15.58%
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Table 4.2. Summary Statistics (verbose) for the L61, HTTP Protocol
Platform
(ENIP)
rate Repetition Mean StdDev Var Min Max
Baseline-L61 10x5 run1 18.03% 1.31% 0.02% 15.87% 22.33%
run2 17.50% 1.29% 0.02% 14.47% 20.00%
run3 22.63% 3.07% 0.09% 17.27% 30.60%
1x50 run1 0.66% 4.64% 0.22% 0.00% 32.80%
run2 0.64% 4.53% 0.20% 0.00% 32.00%
run3 0.69% 4.86% 0.24% 0.00% 34.40%
25x2 run1 54.09% 2.22% 0.05% 46.33% 57.20%
run2 54.19% 2.31% 0.05% 46.60% 58.07%
run3 59.16% 1.95% 0.04% 50.80% 62.93%
2x25 run1 0.09% 0.09% 0.00% 0.00% 0.47%
run2 0.14% 0.21% 0.00% 0.00% 1.20%
run3 0.21% 0.64% 0.00% 0.00% 4.47%
5x10 run1 14.12% 1.48% 0.02% 10.67% 17.47%
run2 13.48% 1.91% 0.04% 7.27% 17.53%
run3 12.52% 1.50% 0.02% 9.00% 15.07%
PC-L61 10x5 run1 32.28% 0.11% 0.00% 32.07% 32.53%
run2 32.27% 0.13% 0.00% 31.80% 32.47%
run3 32.21% 0.16% 0.00% 31.73% 32.53%
1x50 run1 32.41% 0.09% 0.00% 32.13% 32.53%
run2 32.43% 0.11% 0.00% 32.00% 32.53%
run3 32.44% 0.06% 0.00% 32.33% 32.53%
25x2 run1 58.53% 1.32% 0.02% 54.80% 60.67%
run2 58.44% 1.50% 0.02% 51.87% 60.87%
run3 63.11% 1.51% 0.02% 57.67% 66.27%
2x25 run1 32.47% 0.07% 0.00% 32.27% 32.53%
run2 32.47% 0.08% 0.00% 32.13% 32.53%
run3 32.33% 0.11% 0.00% 32.07% 32.53%
5x10 run1 32.34% 0.11% 0.00% 32.13% 32.53%
run2 32.33% 0.12% 0.00% 32.07% 32.53%
run3 32.30% 0.11% 0.00% 32.07% 32.53%
Pi-L61 10x5 run1 31.87% 0.24% 0.00% 31.33% 32.27%
run2 31.91% 0.22% 0.00% 31.33% 32.33%
run3 31.74% 0.19% 0.00% 31.40% 32.20%
1x50 run1 32.11% 0.18% 0.00% 31.67% 32.47%
run2 32.05% 0.21% 0.00% 31.47% 32.47%
run3 32.10% 0.16% 0.00% 31.73% 32.40%
25x2 run1 57.35% 1.93% 0.04% 51.27% 64.00%
run2 57.42% 1.31% 0.02% 53.80% 60.33%
run3 62.13% 1.57% 0.02% 56.20% 65.07%
2x25 run1 32.24% 0.14% 0.00% 31.87% 32.47%
run2 32.25% 0.16% 0.00% 31.73% 32.47%
run3 32.24% 0.14% 0.00% 31.80% 32.53%
5x10 run1 31.95% 0.16% 0.00% 31.67% 32.47%
run2 31.95% 0.23% 0.00% 31.40% 32.27%
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Table 4.3. Summary Statistics (verbose) for the CP1L, ENIP Protocol
Platform
(ENIP)
rate Repetition Mean StdDev Var Min Max
Baseline-CP1L 1x80 run1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
run2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
run3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2x40 run1 3.68% 13.98% 1.95% 0.00% 75.04%
run2 2.43% 8.80% 0.77% 0.00% 45.83%
run3 4.23% 18.01% 3.25% 0.00% 92.00%
4x20 run1 13.83% 30.08% 9.05% 0.29% 99.21%
run2 11.52% 22.99% 5.28% 0.33% 99.17%
run3 7.78% 16.02% 2.57% 0.29% 75.79%
PC-CP1L 1x80 run1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
run2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
run3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2x40 run1 0.17% 0.11% 0.00% 0.00% 0.46%
run2 0.17% 0.13% 0.00% 0.00% 0.54%
run3 0.19% 0.15% 0.00% 0.00% 0.63%
4x20 run1 28.35% 4.40% 0.19% 23.38% 52.92%
run2 28.34% 4.25% 0.18% 23.58% 50.96%
run3 28.39% 4.90% 0.24% 24.71% 51.04%
Pi-CP1L 1x80 run1 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
run2 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
run3 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
2x40 run1 3.09% 10.43% 1.09% 0.00% 49.71%
run2 1.32% 5.94% 0.35% 0.00% 42.33%
run3 2.80% 9.96% 0.99% 0.00% 58.63%
4x20 run1 29.36% 9.20% 0.85% 22.92% 87.04%
run2 29.87% 7.77% 0.60% 24.33% 67.33%
run3 29.31% 6.49% 0.42% 23.83% 60.88%
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Table 4.4. Summary Statistics (verbose) for the CP1L, HTTP Protocol
Platform
(ENIP)
rate Repetition Mean StdDev Var Min Max
Baseline-CP1L 1x20 run1 87.59% 0.45% 0.00% 86.67% 88.50%
run2 87.68% 0.42% 0.00% 86.50% 88.50%
run3 87.71% 0.44% 0.00% 86.83% 88.50%
2x10 run1 85.83% 0.83% 0.01% 83.50% 87.33%
run2 85.74% 0.77% 0.01% 83.00% 87.67%
run3 85.75% 0.70% 0.00% 84.33% 87.50%
4x5 run1 86.76% 0.63% 0.00% 85.33% 88.17%
run2 86.79% 0.60% 0.00% 85.83% 88.33%
run3 86.78% 0.64% 0.00% 85.33% 87.83%
PC-CP1L 1x20 run1 88.66% 0.02% 0.00% 88.50% 88.67%
run2 88.65% 0.05% 0.00% 88.50% 88.67%
run3 88.66% 0.05% 0.00% 88.50% 88.83%
2x10 run1 88.88% 0.18% 0.00% 88.67% 89.33%
run2 88.87% 0.16% 0.00% 88.67% 89.33%
run3 88.86% 0.18% 0.00% 88.67% 89.17%
4x5 run1 88.69% 0.06% 0.00% 88.67% 88.83%
run2 88.66% 0.05% 0.00% 88.50% 88.83%
run3 88.69% 0.08% 0.00% 88.50% 89.00%
Pi-CP1L 1x20 run1 88.73% 0.32% 0.00% 88.50% 90.83%
run2 88.79% 0.52% 0.00% 88.50% 91.50%
run3 88.66% 0.08% 0.00% 88.50% 88.83%
2x10 run1 89.15% 0.22% 0.00% 88.83% 90.17%
run2 89.08% 0.18% 0.00% 88.83% 89.50%
run3 89.18% 0.30% 0.00% 88.67% 90.67%
4x5 run1 89.42% 2.66% 0.07% 88.50% 100.00%
run2 88.69% 0.13% 0.00% 88.50% 89.33%
run3 88.68% 0.18% 0.00% 88.50% 89.83%
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often expensive, hardware and software used by Industrial Control System (ICS) devices creates the challenging problem
of building a flexible, economical, and scalable honeypot. This research extends Honeyd into Honeyd+, making it
possible to use the proxy feature to create multiple high interaction honeypots with a single Programmable Logic
Controller (PLC). Honeyd+ is tested with a network of 75 decoy PLCs, and the interactions with the decoys are
compared to a physical PLC to test for authenticity. The performance test evaluates the impact of multiple simultaneous
connections to the PLC. The functional test is successful in all cases. The performance test demonstrated that the PLC
is a limiting factor, and that introducing Honeyd+ has a marginal impact on performance. Notable findings are that the
Raspberry Pi is the preferred hosting platform, and more than five simultaneous connections were not optimal.
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